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Master's Thesis Proposal 
Thesis Topic  
Strategic Analysis of Electronic Arts 
Motivation: 
This document is prepared for the purposes of strategic management, financial analysis, performance measurement, 
brand strategy, company valuation, and crisis management.  Concerning the various indicators of entertainment industry.  
 
Electronic arts is a company operating in interactive entertainment software niche of entertainment industry. The 
company has several business units to meet various demands of its customers. The company has been experiencing 
alteration in administration, organizational structure, operating and controlling mechanisms. The changes and how did 
the company evolve over time will make an interesting case study. EA is the world’s leading companies in interactive 
software development with successful emergence from the famous IT bubbles in late 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
 
 Forecasting and analyzing company performance in entertainment industry is very difficult and requires complex 
analysis of various indicators such as industry financial models, business cycles, elasticity of demand etc. This new niche 
in entertainment industry emerges with advancements in IT. One could easily lead to a conclusion that companies such 
as EA and others were the pioneers in this niche within the entertainment industry.  
 
The circumstance in this particular industry has led to creation of a unique opportunity to utilize M&A as a means of 
core business practice. This stands in contrast to the widely accepted practice.  The author would analyze this anomaly to 
test the following hypotheses. 
Hypotheses: 
1. The company has shown extreme flexibility in response to industry fluctuations and business cycle. 
2. The company has adopted the right business model for its particular industry.  
3. The company has focused more on acquisition rather than internal, intrinsic value generation. This focus has 
not been harmful to the longevity of the company. 
4. The company is more focused on short term profit rather than long term sustainability. 
5. M&As did not impact the company in 2009 economic recession. 
 
Methodology:  
1. I intend to gather data about industry fluctuations and business cycles within the industry. The important part 
of this analysis is the demand elasticity and relevant markets (Vogel 2001). This will aid in understanding the 
firm and its competitors.  
2. The study will begin with an analysis of the formal company structure, its vision and mission statements. This 
analysis will be in line with the strategic and corporate views of David (2009). Afterwards I will look closer to 
the strategies being used by the company and will perform both internal and external audit. This will then be 
quantified using several matrices (EFE, CPM, and IE).  I will then turn my attention to long term strategies, 
strategic initiatives. I will then generate strategies and compare to the company’s generated strategies and how 
efficient the company is in its organizational structure.  
3. The second phase of the study will focus on strategy implementation, and how strategy is used across various 
functions of the company. I intend to use discounted cash flow model and enterprise valuation methods to 
measure the company’s wellbeing to quantify my analysis of strategy implementation. (Robert, Reilly 2000 and 
Koller 2005). 
4. Another section here will be dedicated to risk and crisis management. How well does the company measure 
risk and what are the policy implications. I intend to create two subsamples of cash flow analysis, the expansion 
phase (1999-2007) and the recovery phase (2009-2015). In an effort to uncover the company’s crisis 
management, by using the projection of cash flows into the future I will create an artificial prediction of 2009-
2015 and compared the two. In addition, I will make a forecast for upcoming years (i.e. 2016 onwards). 
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Expected Contribution: 
The expected contribution is to M&A literature with evidence that it can be used for core strategy of a company. M&A 
does not affect the company’s main value generation and it does not threat the long term sustainability of the company. 
Furthermore, the author will provide findings that M&A on large scale does not create volatility and the company 
behaves with in accepted, stable conditions. 
Outline: 
1. Motivation is based on data collection and industry analysis to gain a better perspective of company’s current 
managerial style, organizational matrix, financial accounting, and use of company valuation. 
2. Study of Electronic Arts: I will use the strategic management frame work and financial accounting to uncover 
company’s various financial and market variables. 
3. Data: The major source of my data will be EA’s financial statements (1999-2015) and stock price published by 
NASDAQ.  
4. The second major sources of data will be Bloomberg business reviews and Journal Economic and Management 
Strategy. 
5. Methods: I will use the strategy formulation, implementation, and evaluation in detail. Including all the matrices 
and balanced scorecard approach.  
6. Result: I will generate alternative strategies based on my analysis for internal and external audits.  
7. Conclusion: I will summarize my findings company’s strategic positioning and their performance management 
in my study and give recommendation for future development. 
 
Core Bibliography: 
1. Corts, K. S., 2001. The Strategic Effects of Vertical Market Structure: Common Agency and Divisionalization 
in the US Motion Picture Industry. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, pp. 509-528. 
2. David, F. R., 2009. Strategic management: concepts and cases. 13th Ed. New Jersey: Pearson. 
3. John A. Pearce II, R. B. R., 2013. Strategic Management - Formulation, Implementation, and Control. 12th ed. 
Wisconsin: Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
4. Kaplan, S. R., Norton, P. D., 1996. The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
5. Koller, G. W., 2005. Valuation: Measuring and managing the value of companies. 7th ed. Hoboken (New 
Jersey): John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
6. Porter, A. M. M. a. M. E., 1997. How much does industry matter, really? Strategic Management Journal, pp. 15-
30. 
7. Robert F. Reilly, R. P. S., 2000. Valuing a Business. New York: McGraw-Hill Professional.  
8. Vogel, H. L., 2001. Entertainment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial Analysis. 5th ed. Cambridge: 

















1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Motivation for the Work  
The author was motivated to investigate the structure and the impact of mergers and acquisitions on 
large corporations. The concept of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has met with some mixed 
reactions amongst those who study it. The author will address a wide range of topics in this thesis 
but the main question is about mergers and acquisitions. Historically, the company in question has 
been and continues to be involved in a very aggressive market strategy of acquisitions. The company 
has prospered despite having acquired many companies. Is M&A the main driver of success? Or is it 
the managerial strategy which directs the company effort that brings EA its success?  
In this thesis the author will present the case of a company with a long history of mergers 
and acquisitions. The author finds the case of this company to be most intriguing. The nature of 
demand and industry structure forces companies to engage in aggressive M&A practices. In this 
case, M&A is a vital corporate strategy. The author will also investigate other means by which 
aggressive M&A is also presented.    
 
1.2 Structure of the Work 
This thesis contains a thorough business and strategic analysis of Electronic Arts™ - a 
developer and publishing company whose main value generations stem from the interactive software 
of entertainment industry. Advances in the computer sciences and IT gave a complete overhaul of 
this industry by providing faster computer processes and limited implications of quantum 
computing. These developments changed the business model, means of delivery, and even business 
to business relations. Interactive software development faces a challenge greater than other niches in 
IT - a rapidly changing demand from its customers. The demand in this niche is very complex due 
to the educational and socio-economic background of its customers. Currently, the customers of this 
niche are mainly between the ages brackets of 15-35. The share of current customers shrinks as we 
increase the age brackets but it may not be the case in future. To cope with this changing demand, 
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most companies in this sector employ M&As for staying ahead of their competition, this prompted 
the motivation behind this thesis.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze various economic and financial indicators to assess 
the effect of aggressive mergers and acquisitions on the company’s long term bottom line. In 
addition, the document will serve as an academic and professional milestone due to its broad 
spectrum of topics from strategic management and market positioning to financial management. 
The author will employ strategic corporate framework provided by David (2009) and then will focus 
on the financial accounting analysis of the balance sheet and income statement (discounted cash 
flow), and enterprise valuation techniques.  
This thesis contains the following structure: Chapter two will focus on company history and 
how it evolved over time. Chapter three will be dedicated to formal assessment of the company’s 
image and outlook. The author will focus on the mission, vision, and company’s ideological 
foundations. Chapter four will focus on the broader industry in which the business is concluded. 
Chapter five will provide an in-depth external audit of the company. The audit will cover various 
matrices such as competitive profile matrix and etc. The aim of these matrices is to provide a better 
picture of the company’s market positioning. Chapter six will be the longest and most detail- 
oriented in this thesis. This chapter provides quantitative evidence in addition to its internal 
managerial audit. The matrices involved include internal factor evaluation and grand strategy matrix 
among others. Chapter seven will be the final chapter which will conclude the findings and the 
author will provide his own take on the subject of mergers and acquisitions.  
1.3 Literature Review    
 The author will address a wide range of topics in this thesis but the main question revolves 
around mergers and acquisition. The general opinion is that companies must retain and grow their 
intrinsic value. The author found evidence to the contrary pointed out by Wang and Moini (2012) 
from Denmark. In contrast, there has been evidence of negative reception from USA’s large 
corporation with an acquisition announcement (Moeller, et al., 2004). More recent studies have a 
different take of M&As. “…The stock returns of bidders are not significantly different from before 
mergers”. (Malmendier, et al., 2012). The author agrees with another study done by DePamphilis 
that “the majority of mergers and acquisitions have a success or failure depending on how the 
success metrics is defined (DePamphilis, 2012). There is no one standard measure that fits all cases, 
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but rather the measures are industry-specific and open to debate. While the author does not believe 
aggressive mergers are healthy for every company, he does not share the opinion of Koller that 
“intrinsic value is better than acquisition” (Koller, et al,. 2005).  
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2 Overview of EA: An Evolving Company.  
2.1 EA History (1985-2015) 
Electronic Arts is a global company with headquarters situated in Redwood City, California, United 
States. EA has been an American software developer, marketer, publisher, and distributer of 
interactive software for more than three decades. It was founded it 1983 by Trip Hawkins, an 
American entrepreneur who also founded 3DO and Digital Chocolate. Hawkins left apple Inc. to 
build one of the most successful companies in entertainment industry. EA started its operation with 
a mandate of an independent publisher. According to Bloomberg “EA became a professional 
conduit for other people’s work” (Waugh, 2006). As the company grew, its managerial needs grew 
with it. Hawkins began his recruitment of his former colleagues from Apple, Atari, Xerox PARC, 
and VisiCorp. The most notable of them was Steve Wozniak who agreed to sit on EA’s board of 
directors. (Levy, 1984).  
 After a successful launch in 1983, the company started to expand drastically. In 1990 EA 
decided to take part in the new “Sega” console. After their joint venture EA was more focused on 
intrinsic growth (Waugh 2006). It has been suggested by Waugh that Trip Hawkins was more of a 
developer than a businessman. In 1991 Hawkins left the company to Larry Probst. After this change 
in management the company started to venture in a different direction.  
 After Hawkins’s departure in 91, EA listed itself on the stock market and began a wave of 
acquisitions beginning with “Distinctive Software” and started to expand further in the industry. 
Amongst its list of acquired companies, the most notable ones are “Maxis” and “Westwood”. These 
two acquisitions plunged EA into many controversies about their future plans. Waugh (2006) 
believes that there is a pattern to these acquisitions. He claims that EA finds a company that attracts 
customers with its intellectual property and will absorb their ingenuity through the use of mergers.  
 EA’s continuous mergers with successful smaller companies became wide practice amongst 
its competitors. This instrument was used in the past and it is still being used as one of their core 
strategic tools to generate revenue.  
 During this time frame, EA started to receive various forms of publicity. In 2005 a writer 
and game developer, Erin Hoffman detailed the daily events of her life on Live Journal (Hoffman, 
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2005). Her husband was working at a Development studio. “The current mandatory hours are 9am 
to 10pm – seven days a week.” She wrote in her online journal, “with the occasional Saturday 
evenings off for good behavior at 6:30pm” she added. It was these lines and many more that 
prompted a response in other employees. Three class action lawsuits caused changes in various 
aspects of the industry, such as employment type. The law suit causes a reclassification of entry-level 
artists as hourly employees and makes them eligible for overtime under California law. The 
Guardian reports that EA reached a settlement of 15.6 million dollars (Williams, 2005). A similar law 
suit was lost by EA for 14.5 million dollars.  
 In February 2007 Probst stepped down as EA’s CEO while remaining on the Board of 
Directors. His successor John Riccitiello, who was an employee of EA for years, sat on his chair. 
Though the management had changed, EA’s long standing business policy of aggressive mergers 
remained. The newly appointed CEO, Riccitiello, started the overhaul process for EA. Under his 
management, EA would be divided into four divisions or “labels”, each with autonomy over their 
own product development and publishing. The mandate of the reorganization was to create 
independent operations of various business components, faster decision making processed and 
increased creativity and quality. However, the strategy was more aimed at rapid market expansion 
(Electronic Arts, 2007). A week later, EA faced its largest merger yet -the acquisition of VG Holding 
Corp.This deal was reported to be worth $775 million (Letzing, 2007).  
In 2008, EA was challenged by an economic crisis which had started a year ago in the United States. 
Riccitiello admitted that the company’s poor performance was caused  by the financial crisis, but he 
also noted that EA did not publish any “blockbuster” games in the fourth quarter of 2008.  
In 2013, Andrew Wilson became the new CEO of EA and started to close down several divisions of 
EA. Under his management EA will focus on smaller projects and creations of “Competitive gaming 
experience and ESpost events”. (Pereira, 2015).  
2.2 Financial History of EA  
In this section the author will examine the financial history and the market’s attitude towards 
the company. One of the most important indicators is the stock price. Figure one will explain the 
prices of EA from its conception in 1990 until February 2017.  
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Figure 1: Electronic Arts evolution of stock price (1990-2017)
 
Source: Yahoo finance.  
The trend is fairly apparent. The company’s stock prices began to rise over time. The 
company started as a small company operating in the industry. As the industry grew, the company 
grew with it. We can see the fluctuation in the late 90s and early 2000s. This sudden shock is 
attributed to the infamous IT bubble. Unlike many in the industry, EA was a company that was 
justly priced.  When the bubble burst, the company lost some credibility amongst the investors. In 
the years following  the bubble we see a clear increasing trend for the stock price. This trend ceases 
to exist during the events of Subprime mortgage crisis.  
When comparing the IT bubble and subprime crisis one must consider that the majority of 
the mortgage owners belong to the middle class socio-economic background. As the crisis unfolds 
the company price falls with it. It took a long recovery and reconsideration of their business strategy 
to make this leading software developer return to its initial upward trend at the end of 2016. The 
author acknowledges that the 2016 price spike might be due to United States Electoral cycle (45th 
Presidential Election).  
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3 EA Formal Business Assessment  
3.1 Company Vision.  
Strategic Management is an ongoing process of understanding and adapting to business outlook and 
orientation. The analysis of strategic management begins with a Formal Assessment of the 
company’s mission and vision statements.  
 A vision statement is usually a short description of the company’s founding principles, 
structured so that it will give the reader the company’s reason for existence by providing the utility 
generated from their company. Unfortunately, Electronic Arts does not provide a precise business 
vision in their annual reports or website. The business may suffer from lack of identity if the vision 
statement is not publicly known and clearly defined.  
3.2 Company’s Mission Statement     
A mission Statement can provide a basis of managerial decision making, As David (2009) 
suggested: “Another benefit of developing a comprehensive mission statement is that divergent 
views among managers can be revealed and resolved through this process.” According to him, a 
second mission statement must address nine crucial topics. These topics are  
 Customer 
 Product and service  
 Markets 
 Technology 
 Concern for survival, growth, and profitability 
 Philosophy of the company  
 Self-concept 
 Concern for public image  
 Concern for employee 
When it comes to the written mission statement, there are no solid measures to state 
whether one mission statement is better than others. It is case-specific and companies who truly 
understand their business can draft an appropriate one for their company. EA’s statement is very 
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unconventional to these nine concepts. The firm begins by calling their values “actions”. According 
to EA these “actions” provide a guideline for their interactions with customers, partners, and 
suppliers. These actions are considered to be basis of EA’s “global code of conduct”. Therefore, by 
definition they can be used for the basis of our analysis. Below, we analyze how these values are 
related to our frame of reference.  
Be bold:  
EA explains the notion by the following statement. “Go big, take the right risk, back our 
bets, lead.” While this statement can be interpreted in number of ways, the author firmly believes 
that it was intended for employees. The statement is giving employees the directive to be the best 
they can be. While it genuinely conveys a quality that employees must display, it is structured so that 
it may be perceived as a one-sided, ambiguous rhetoric. Employees must take the right risks, back 
their bets, lead, but it fails to mention how the company will value their contribution to its whole 
overall strategy. 
Think player first: 
The notion is explained by: “Listen, respond, deliver beyond their expectations and build life 
time players.” Judging by the structure of this statement and considering its meaning in the context 
of global code of conducts, it is clearly intended for the customers of EA. The creator of this 
statement has wisely chosen the word “player” to convey the utility attributed to their customers. 
While it does touch upon the customer, the statement is indirectly related to employees.  
Create quality and innovation:  
“Deliver products and services that surpass expectations, be relentless about improving 
quality, and take creative risks.” It follows the pursuit of constant improvements for EA’s products. 
But it fails to specify what the firm’s major products are and which attributes or aspects of their 
products should be improved upon.  
Act with integrity: 
“Do the right thing, trust others and support their decision, be transparent.” This line can be 
attributed to their employees and support structure inside the company. It speaks of how employees 
should behave, yet it fails to provide proof for employee’s value to the company.  
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Be Accountable:  
“Deliver commitments, always do what we say, play our position, deliver and reward 
results.” Another line from their code of conduct but this one seems to be more aimed at staff 
members in managerial positions. While it gives basis for how an employee should behave, it fails to 
provide the employees’ value to the company.  
Learn and grow: 
“Work hard, play hard, develop yourself and others, measure your improvements, share 
knowledge generously.” This statement can be interpreted as the message a company gives to 
society. The message is again focused on the employees and how they will grow and improve upon 
society as a whole.  
As we analyze the “actions” provided by EA’s code of conduct published on both company 
website and in annual reports, it is easy to point out that the company did not touch upon important 
topics such as the self-concept, technology, and markets of the company. One could argue that the 
company’s philosophical roots are blurry and the company may suffer from lack of vision, however, 
reading these “actions” one could get a sense of the company’s ideological foundation. A foundation 
that is at odds with their policy directives, as will be proven in chapters ahead. 
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4 Industry Analysis    
4.1 Historical Overview 
It is commonly known that the interactive software industry planted its roots in the 20th century. In 
2005, Ralph Baer was awarded the National medal of technology by President George W. Bush for 
his contributions to the industry. He was an electronic engineer and defense contractor for the US 
armed forces in 1951. It was he who first brought the idea of linking interactive software to 
television sets.  
The idea could not come to life for another fifteen years. In 1966, he was granted an 
opportunity to create his vision. The following year, he and a group of engineers developed the first 
interactive software that could be displayed on a television set. Several years later, in 1972, the first 
game console named “Magnavox Odyssey, was brought to the center of attention in California 
(McDonald, 2004). 
Despite Magnavox Odyssey’s success at the time, the product was priced at $100 which was 
considered to be expensive at the time. Furthermore, there was public misunderstanding of 
technology at the time which led to a rumor that Magnavox needs a special television set (Magnavox 
TV). This misconception undoubtedly caused the considerable plummeting   of the sales. Though 
they managed to sell nearly 100,000 units in their first year, it eventually lost its dominant position in 
the market when other companies started to take notice of their success.  
In just one year, a startup company founded by Nolan Bushnell and “Atari” rose to a 
dominant position through product differentiation techniques. Their success was owed to the sound 
and high success of their simple ball and paddle game and other products such as pong. Between the 
years of 1972-1974 more than 30 products was released by 11 companies to be played on Atari 
console system. In 1976, the market showed an incredible growth leading to 60% more demand 
than any company forecast or anticipated (Business Week, 1976).  
By 1983 the sales were close to $3.2 Billion, with a 400% jump in revenue comparing to its 
previous year. With such high demand, companies started to enjoy huge margins including market 
share with limited competition in the United States. As is often the case of markets with low 
competition, the quality started to decline. In 1984, there came a shock to this market - home 
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computers were available at relatively lower prices. Consumers had an opportunity to procure low 
cost computers with superior technology. They chose the latter and sales began to fall drastically. 
These events led to the crash of interactive software industry in 1984 (Kent, 2001). 
As the years passed, computers became more sophisticated; “The number of components on 
computer chips will double every eighteen months and two years.” Said Gordon Moore in his 1965 
paper “Electronics” (Brock, 2006). As these components increased, so did the storage area for 
software which allowed for bigger and more complex ones to be developed. These allowed 
interactive software developers to incorporate high quality music and graphics. During the 80s, 
Nintendo dominated the market. As we get closer to 90s, the picture begins to change. A rise of 
other startups and big corporations such as Sony and Microsoft began to contribute to this niche 
with Sony’s entrance in 1996 and Microsoft’s Xbox in 2001 (Kolter & Keller, 2009). 
Today, the market is stretched far and wide across the globe. The products do not include 
entertainment niche such as video games. Interactive software has found its place in military combat 
simulations and educational purposes for important professions such as flight simulations in NASA 
and other aviation applications like civilian aircraft simulation. In medical science and specifically in 
surgical procedures, students will first operate on a computer-based simulation using the very same 
technology and software that is used to play video games. With its real-life and often three-
dimensional simulations, students will start their training on these computer-based simulations 
before advancing themselves to their respective positions. 
The dominant position in this niche is directly related to the development of technology as 
was the case of Sony and Microsoft. They held enough capital to patiently research and develop the 
next generation of consoles. A bypass strategy is widely practiced in high-tech industry. To ensure 
success, companies must say ahead of the research curve or risk losing the market.  
4.2 Structural Analysis 
“A structural analysis gives a framework for understanding the competitive force for operating 
in an industry that is crucial to developing competitive strategy.” (Porter, 1980) When we analyze the 
international business environment, examining the industry’s frame work will provide context to our 
analysis and aid in giving a clear picture between how the firms position themselves in their 
respective niches. Interactive software development is currently dominated by multinational 
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corporations. This section provides a brief overview of vertical spectrum and upstream and 
downstream markets. We will compare two of the largest manufacturers of interactive software and 
their respective value chains.  
The interactive software development can be segmented into five vertical stages: 
Development, Publishing, Manufacturing, Distribution, and Retailing. This industry also consists of 
two very distinctive sides, hardware and software development. Although hardware development is 
very important and plays pivotal point in the structure of IT industry, it is not the focus of this 
thesis. As many other industries, some of their activities can be done indoors while others may be 
outsourced. This section will focus solely on vertical integration.  
4.2.1 The Upstream Market   
The upstream market is consists of hardware and software. Four main sources of hardware 
for users were the PC with 52% usage, Smartphone or tablets with 44%, Sony’s play station and 
Microsoft’s Xbox with 28% and 23% respectively (Game Developer Conference, 2016). Software is 
mostly developed in-house or companies’ developers are mostly acquired by large publishers and 
thus exercise less autonomy. It stands to reason that they are provided higher funding through their 
parent company. With customer demand showing increase in complexity, it is not very easy to start a 
company in this niche. It has become increasingly more expensive to develop interactive software. A 
Ubisoft executive gave a breakdown of the company’s average development costs per software with 
a DS title costing between $785,000 to $1.57 million, “PS3/Xbox/PC” titles averaging $19-$28 
million to create for all three platforms, and a “Wii game” expected to cost $7 to $ million to 
develop (Boyer, 2008). Rising costs and lack of financing have forced the companies to engage in 
brutal competition. In the Crisis of 2007 and its aftermath, economists expected the industry to 
shrink in size and crash. It has however shown a steady stream of customers who are willing to pay 
for what is justly categorized as a luxury good. The figure below illustrates the sales in the United 
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Figure 2: Physical Retail Sales of Interactive Software in the US, (In millions of US dollars) 
 
Source: Statista  
As overall industry indicators have not changed before and after the global crisis, developers 
are still lacking financial support which is often obtained by large corporations.  
4.2.2 The Downstream Market    
The downstream market will commence at distribution; it also contains the same components of 
hardware and software as the upstream market. Publishers often organize the distribution of the 
software. Each publisher is legally obliged to obtain a license for the right to sell the software to a 
particular platform and thus pay royalty fees. Within this industry, Microsoft is the only company 
which has integrated all three functions of software development, hardware development and 
manufacturing and publishing under the same roof. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Electronic Arts became the largest independent publisher of sales by volume after their merger with 
“VG Holding Corp”. However, their dominant position came under threat when United States 
based “Activision Inc” announced a merger with Japanese company “Konami” and French based 
“Vivendi” and “Ubisoft”.  
As for the sales, publishers organize distribution rings through local means such as supermarkets, 
toy specialists and department stores. As one survey found out in Ireland, supermarkets account for 
34%, toy specialists for 14% and department stores combined together accounted for 75% of 
distribution in 2006 (Euromonitor International, 2006). While the physical distribution is still a part 
of revenue, we begin to see an increasing trend toward digital methods of delivery over the internet.  
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Figure 3: Sales of Software by Top Five Publishing Companies 
 
Source: Bloomberg Business.  
With physical sales on the left of each quarter and digital sales on the right, it is intriguing to 
note that the New Year holidays were the only period when physical sales outperformed digital sales.  
4.2.3 Regional Value Chain  
There are a number of traditional markets worldwide. Three regions are divided between 
North America, Europe and the Middle East and Asia - Pacific (Datamonitor, 2008). The United 
States has the largest number and concentration of both developers and publishers with a dominant 
presence in global markets. This can be attributed to IT hubs such as Silicon Valley, which as the 
largest market in the world accounts, for $15.4 billion in 2014 (The Statistics Portal, 2016).  
4.2.4 Company Strategy  
 A company’s position is often determined by the characteristics of the markets they 
operate in. These characteristics include (Daniels, et al., 2009):  
 Degree of specialization: the degree to which companies should focus their efforts in 
accordance to their product lines, the target segments, and the geographical markets 
served.  
 Brand Identification: the degree to which the companies should seek brand 
identification rather than competition on price and other variables achieved via 
advertising sales, and etc.  
Industry Analysis 15 
 
 Technological Leadership: the degree to which companies should compete to 
produce technological innovations.  
 Cost positioning: the sales strategy they should choose, such as low quality, low cost; 
or high quality, high cost.  
4.2.5 Electronic Arts Strategy  
The aim of this thesis is to understand the behavior of Electronic Arts in the market. A rival 
firm (Activision Blizzard) was also chosen for the purposes of bench marking. As EA’s main rival it 
is important to understand and compare their strategies with each other. Electronic Arts had a 
market share of 11% in 2014 (Shields, 2015). To maintain such high ratios, EA must acquire a 
portfolio of licenses and rights. These licenses allow for updates and continuation of their franchise. 
EA has chosen to acquire other independent developers or procure license to their most successful 
ventures. During the 2014 fiscal year  Electronic Arts experienced $3.5 billion in revenue worldwide 
with negative 6% (decrease) from the previous year (Electronic Arts, 2014). As indicated, EA has 
experienced slow growth and underperformed their expectations. According to their 2014 annual 
report, this decrease is “primarily due to the increase in our estimated offerings period”. At this 
point the largest threat to their activities is further loss of market share to Activision Blizzard. 
4.2.6 Activision Blizzard Strategy  
Activision and Vivendi Blizzard merged in 2007, forming the well-known Activision 
Blizzard. The newly created company is currently leading the market by commanding 13% of the 
market share (IBIS World). The merger brought several companies from different corners of the 
world together and created a super pack of very diverse people. As we discussed in EA’s strategy, 
acquiring smaller independent companies is a widely accepted practice in this industry.  
4.2.7 Emergence of Internet  
Internet access has become increasingly more available for people across the globe. In 
addition, there is an increase in speed of broadband, making internet access easier than before. 
Internet is perceived as a desired platform to offer interactive software to customers. For instance, 
the Chinese internet giant grew 22% in net growth in the fourth quarter with the net profit $1.8 
billion, offering online interactive software (Osawa, 2016). Further development of internet service 
will offer multidimensional potential for companies such as Electronic Arts. The old business model 
composed of sales via retailers as mediators of tangible products, whereas the new model includes 
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the delivery of software via internet and companies have shown great interest in this subject 
(Brustien, 2015) to utilize such a model would eliminate the threat of digital piracy and illegal 
distribution, however, this venue is not completely explored yet. The companies must further invest 
to provide a server, which is considered a sunk cost, and maintain their servers as it would become a 
prime part of their value generation process. While it may seem optimal, it is not without its 
challenges. Digital piracy may hurt company revenues, but reliance on the internet would expose the 
company to cyber-attacks. Therefore, an optimal strategy would call for investment in both. 
However, as the sunk costs of owning and maintaining a server may be high, companies are 
reluctant to offer their product via internet.  
4.2.8 Customer Demographics of Industry 
Interactive software niche is very diverse and has one of the richest demographics amongst 
its customers. When we look at the data provided by Entertainment Software Association in 2015, 
we can get a clear picture of demographics in the American Market. According to this report, 155 
million Americans are regular subscribers to such software - that means two users on average in each 
household. The age group of under 18 holds 26% of the total user in the dataset, with a higher 
percentage of females in this group. The age group between 18-35 holds 30 % of users. This age 
group holds the highest concentration of users compared to the rest. The age group of 36-49 and 
50+ has 17% and 27% of total customers respectively (Entertainment Software Association, 2015). 
Judging by the data provided it is easy to see that 56% of customers are below 36 years old. 
Electronic Arts and other competitors target young people that have similar profiles which creates 
certain homogeneity in the marketing approach. This also presents a challenge for companies to 
avoid banal products and become festered with creativity. In the world of business this creativity 
means more search for graphical and dramatically artistic expression leading to further expansion of 
intangible properties and ultimately additional costs of market research.  
4.3 Porter’s Five Forces Model 
Porter’s Five Forces Model is a framework that analyzes competition within an industry and 
business strategy development (Porter, et al., 2002). In this section the author will conduct a 
replication of this model in the interactive software industry.  
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4.3.1 Customers  
Buyer power is considered to be high to moderate. Customers in this industry are mainly 
software users with specifically identified profiles which were mentioned in demographics of the 
industry. Customer demand has a strong pull on the publishers. Customers demand better quality 
and their demand has followed an upward trend toward sophistication over the years. An increase 
cost of developing such software is attributed to the complexity of demand. Buyers have a strong 
negotiating position due their number and their influence over the local market. In addition, buyers 
incur low switching costs and can turn to other publishers if they feel the product is not worthy of 
their financial compensation. This is the reason why both EA and Activision Blizzard are very 
sensitive to publicity and attitude of internet users. With such description we can see that brand 
loyalty is low. Even though a famous franchise or license gave certain recognition and their success 
established through their long-term customers, their success still depends on customer reviews 
which contribute to an increasing market power of buyers. It may seem unfavorable for the industry 
to have such high-powered buyers.  
4.3.2 Suppliers 
Supplier negotiating power is very high, even higher than the buyers’. The development of 
software implies labor intensive products.  This market requires a diverse set of services to perform 
adequately. These services include artists, designers, engineers, programmers and music and visual 
studios. In addition there are many licenses and rights which are considered intellectual property that 
have to be used in final products. The variety of input necessary to create a successful software 
publishing can be considered as research and development. As many independent developers such 
as Electronic Arts and Activision Blizzard do not have adequate capital requirement to invest in the 
hardware, they must accept their input from other suppliers like Nvidia, Radon, Intel, and other 
hardware manufacturers. This hardware can be used to run software engines. All these factors 
magnify the supplier bargaining power to the industry. As they are creators of hardware, they can 
increase the switching cost for the final user. We can provide many examples of Microsoft and Sony 
negotiating with RockStar North™, another developer and publisher. After rounds of negotiations 
they convinced RockStar North to release the next series of their blockbuster franchise “Grand 
Theft Auto V” exclusively on their platforms, leaving the computer users out for nearly one year.  
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4.3.3 New Entry 
The threat of new entrants can be seen as low to moderate. Barriers for entry are not 
enforced by regulators, but rather by the challenge a new startup would pose to established brands. 
Due to high fixed costs in this sector, the entry to this industry can be seen as “unattractive”. 
Furthermore, developments of software are often a lengthy process and the time scale for return on 
investments can be long. Subsequently, companies that wish to start their operation must cover 
tremendous startup (sunk) costs. As mentioned before, one of the important factors contributing to 
the success of products is intellectual property such as software coding and artists’ loyalty fees. It is 
apparent that large companies such as EA would have massive advantage over the startups in both 
software coding and learning curves. Innovative concepts have attracted a lot of attention and 
success by startups. Thus barriers to entry can be described as low. But it will be solely dependent 
on how the new entrants consolidate their concept and image in the market.  
4.3.4 Substitution  
The threat of substitution of products can be considered as moderate. The presence of 
intense rivalry is the major reason contributing to this notion which may deprecate overall 
profitability and unless publishers can offer product differentiation through superior performance 
and unique competitive advantage, it may not survive for long. This industry is also threatened by 
cross-industry substitution. Customers may procure the same level of utility from other products 
such as music, movies, live events, and concerts. Due to the dependency of this industry on 
hardware and platform, it is witnessed that the niche can come under threat from startups operating 
on new platforms such as tablets and Smartphones. 
4.3.5 Rivalry  
As the authors mentioned earlier, the level of competition in this industry is very intense and 
can be categorized as high. The development of successful software is time-consuming and often 
may fail to generate expected profits. Furthermore, this industry’s main value generators are from 
intangible sources and it is labor-intensive. Thus the industry suffers from minimal economics of 
scale; this caused the industry to be intolerant to any increase in production (development) costs 
resulting in intense competition between major players. All the main publishers are almost of similar 
size in terms of market share and have chosen to bring focused strategy that is dependent on lower 
diversification of their product lines which in turn, amplifies the competition.  
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4.3.6 Conclusion of the Model 
This niche is considered to have high competition, high buyer power, desired levels of new 
entrants and high supplier power. The industry is perceived attractive from the customer perspective 
as it has very low switching costs and intense competition forcing firms to be highly flexible to 
customer preferences. The level of financial consolidation in this niche is relatively high and can be 
considered undesirable for the future development of industry.  
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5 External Assessment  
5.1 Competitive Profile Matrix  
“The Competitive Profile Matrix (CPM) identifies a firm’s major competitors and its particular 
positioning in the market.” (David, 2009) CPM strives to create a quantified basis for comparison 
between two firms. As the author has selected the Interactive Software Industry, this thesis will 
continue to examine the differences of strategy in business. The selected firm for this comparison, 
Activision Blizzard, is one EA’s most prominent competitors. Appendix One documents this matrix 
in greater detail. The author has selected several important variables that will determine forces in the 
market competition. Appendix one also documents the score that was assigned to each company. 
Based on a research conducted by the author, Electronic Arts receives the score of 2.49 while 
Activision Blizzard receives 2.76 points. For additional information refer to Appendix one of this 
document. 
The analysis will begin with advertisement in the market. It is the most important part of the 
software development. However, this niche of IT industry is particularly attractive to the younger 
generation who are technologically savvy. Both of these companies have shown strength in their 
advertising strategies.  
Both of these companies adopted what the author considers “Conglomerate Behavior”. 
Conglomerate companies are usually big holdings with many subsidiaries and underlings in their 
portfolio. Their business functions may or may not include profit generation. In case of Activision 
Blizzard and Electronic Arts, these companies venture into the market. They both exercise their 
dominance through the use of mergers and acquisitions. Although acquiring a company is adopted 
by many firms in the industry, the author believes that in-house growth is far more important than 
acquisitions. While many believe the author’s assertions, acquisition is a fast and safe way of market 
penetration.  
The most important part of the CPM is company’s research and development. Both of these 
companies have outperformed their competitors. Another important feature of the competition is 
financial positioning of these companies. Both performed well, but it is documented in the net 
worth analysis (see Appendix III) of these companies that Activision is currently underperforming 
compared to Electronic Arts. The reason is that Electronic Arts had invested in their “labels” and 
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will release a series of profitable block busters in years 2016-2017. (Electronic Arts 2014) Indeed this 
was not a hollow promise and EA did follow through on their word. Furthermore, the distribution 
of the dividends decreased the retained earnings and their market share and has chosen to bring a 
focused strategy that is dependent upon lower diversification in their line of products which will 
ultimately amplify their competition.  
In conclusion, this niche is considered to have intense competition, high buyer power, 
desired levels of new entrants and high supplier power. The industry can be seen as an attractive 
venue from the customer’s perspective as it bears very little switching costs and intense competition 
resulting in the flexibility of firms to customer’s preferences. The level of financial consolidation in 
this niche is relatively high and can be considered as undesirable for future development of the 
industry.  
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5.2 External Factor Evaluation Matrix  
“An External Factor Evaluation Matrix allows strategies to summarize and evaluate economic, 
social, cultural, environmental, demographic, environmental, political, governmental, legal, 
technological and competitive information.” (David, 2009) The EFE matrix is presented in 
Appendix IV.  
Overall, the companies have performed relatively similarly. Both of these companies have 
engaged in heavily invested marketing campaigns; however, it may not be sufficient for their 
profitable investment perspectives. The industry is inherently creative and value generation comes 
from creation of new products, franchise and labels. When it comes to growth, Electronic Arts has 
not performed as well as it did several years ago. According to their 2014 announcement, they have 
plans to make a stand in 2015-16 with their blockbusters. The authors concluded that Electronic 
Arts has not utilized demand for their products to its fullest potential. The author also acknowledges 
that Electronic Arts did follow through with their promise. Unfortunately, their progress during 
2016-17 cannot be taken into consideration in this thesis, because the benchmark firm has not 
completed their annual report as of the time of the publishing of this thesis.  
Both of these firms confirmed relatively the same when it comes to the next generation 
hardware. It is a necessity which is forced on the industry from upstream markets. Both of these 
companies have performed exceptionally well when it comes to capitalization beyond their 
incumbent industry. These expansions include the creation and sales of entertainment novels, action 
figures and inspired blockbuster Hollywood movies.  While EA has pursued this avenue more than 
Activision, they both gathered enough cloud for celebrity involvement of their products to boost 
sales.  
When it comes to diversification, Electronic Arts is at a geographical disadvantage. Activision 
owns and operates in many different countries. While EA’s reliance on its American roots is great, 
they started to take notice of this shortcoming. Currently, EA is making wave acquisitions in the 
South East Asian market. This strategy was a follow up strategy by EA as was acknowledged in their 
annual reports. Their next move would be to demonstrate a presence in Latin American markets. As 
this is a relatively new strategic decision, the author will not comment any further about the success 
or failure of this strategy.  
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In the upcoming chapter about internal assessment, the author has uncovered a strange 
anomaly in the financial reports. Electronic Arts pay less effectively than Activision. One of the 
primary reasons is that, unlike EA with a solely American base, Activision has multiple bases 
dispersed around the globe and thus it is subject to various tax codes. This fact is an important part 
of our matrix, but it will be discussed in greater details in the upcoming chapter.  
When it comes to threats from the exterior environment, the first and foremost topic is digital 
piracy. While it may never disappear from IT industry, there are several attractive alternatives which 
may regain some of the lost revenue. Electronic Arts has demonstrated a strong willingness to 
participate in the online products and use of servers. Electronic Arts has shown its presence in the 
field, however Activision Blizzard has invested much more into their online campaign via their use 
of internet servers. Electronic Arts has realized the need to pursue this avenue as stated in both their 
2014 and 2015 annual reports. So far, Electronic Arts has kept its traditional IT model of relying on 
encryption lucks. The company has invested a large portion of their efforts in related products and 
services. In contrast, Activision has relied on this technique as well as the simultaneous creation of 
an online server. Some of their products can be offered through their servers. Both of these 
strategies are perfectly valid, but the cost of maintaining both may not be easy to bear in the future. 
The perfect analogy would be “a servant of two masters”. The company cannot survive under the 
strain of both costs as their demands increase in complexity.  
As for hardware development which serves as a platform for their respective products, 
Activision falls behind their curve as they are more focused on their online expansions. That was 
until their latest strategy to upgrade their servers and their online platform. Naturally, this upgrade 
places them ahead of Electronic Arts, but it comes at a cost of falling behind on their development 
engines which puts EA ahead of them.  
Both of these companies face threats from misuse of subscriptions in India and China. In this 
particular area, Activision has a vastly superior position due to their embrace of online delivery of 
products.  
Another source of viable threat to both of these companies is bad press or “word of mouth”. 
The author has seen this incident as a sign of strength for Electronic Arts, as it has adopted a liberal 
set of values to be presented in their products. Activision has adopted a rather conservative 
approach and for the most part, they try to remain neutral towards cultural aspects of their products. 
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The author does not make any comments on the right approach to dealing with social matters 
related to their products. Financially speaking, the adoption of liberal ideology has brought more 
business for Electronic Arts.  
  
Internal Assessment 25 
 
6 Internal Assessment 
This section is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of factors which can be controlled or manipulated 
using company strategy and sound decision making. The chapter begins with a financial analysis of 
Electronic Arts and Activision Blizzard. As mentioned before, Activision is a relatively similar 
company to the one which is our main focus. While it is impossible to find two perfectly 
homogenous firms in the market, these two share a great resemblance. The main reason why the 
author has chosen Activision was its presence in NASDAQ. Both of these firms are traded in 
NASDAQ and they must comply with the same standard of financial and accounting reporting 
which makes them comparable. Neither of these firms has other unrelated diversification and they 
do not benefit from synergy with other divisions like the interactive software development in 
Microsoft.   
This chapter begins with an Internal Factor Evaluation Matrix (presented in Appendix V) 
and will continue with the Organizational Matrix. It is then explained how the matrices differ across 
the two companies. In addition, the author will conduct an analysis of the company’s stock 
performance before heading further into their respective balance sheets and income statements. The 
author has dedicated a special section to the company’s performance during the financial crisis of 
2007.  
6.1 Internal Factor Evaluation Matrix    
“This strategy formulation tool summarizes and evaluates the major strengths and weaknesses 
in the functional areas of a business, and it also provides a basis for identifying and evaluation 
relationships in those areas” (David, 2009). The author has constructed this matrix to provide an 
insight into the company and its selected bench mark competitor.  
The global presence and immense success of Activision’s franchise is the primary source of 
strength for Activision and primary source of weakness for EA. Others reasons include strong 
financial indicators, strong R&D positioning, being an industry leader, dominant market position, 
diversification of products, independent ownership of music and visual studios, a strong legal 
department, availability of other liquid assets (mainly cash) and diversity of employee profile. Among 
weaknesses that are mutual to both are the dependency on licensing, low employee morale and 
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productivity, limited product diversification, aggressive mergers rather intrinsic growth, excessive 
equity in case of Electronic Arts and excessive debt in case of Activision.  
The results have been mentioned and discussed over the previous chapter, but the substance 
of the material is yet to be analyzed. Activision’s strength has carved a place above EA’s 
performance. Activision has been able to create a massive amount of profit over the last decade with 
their franchise. The author acknowledges that unlike EA, Activision benefits from an international 
background. EA had to create and defend its longstanding titles such as FIFA series and other series 
under EA Sports®.  
When it comes to financial positioning, Electronic Arts is benefiting from higher margins and 
better cash flow. More information will be presented in the financial analysis of this chapter. While 
Activision is behind on some indicators, the author does not see this as a hallmark of failure. Due to 
hyper sensationalism presented in the market, it is very typical for a company to remain quiet for a 
while before releasing their blockbuster products.  
Another important segment is R&D which includes both companies. The author argues that 
due to the creative nature of both companies, it is easy to mistake the whole company for one giant 
R&D department. R&D is still only a part of a company despite the unwillingness of companies to 
mention it separately in any policy or initiatives. The author believes that EA is ahead of the 
hardware curve due to its immense diversification of products. Activision’s primary source of 
income derives from a series of blockbuster franchises while EA offers a more franchised and more 
diverse set of interactive software to be explored by its customers.  
Another source of strength is that they are both industry leaders. EA is a pioneer in the field, 
but Activision has also carved a respectable name for itself. EA enjoys the benefit of being a pioneer 
and often experiments with newly updated systems and techniques. This pattern of behavior is more 
aggressive in EA than Activision.  
Closely tied to the previous paragraph, market dominance is a major indicator for the 
company’s performance and EA has been lagging behind Activision for several consecutive years. 
Although in 2016 they successfully managed to narrow the gap between themselves and Activision, 
they are still lagging behind. While still controlling large portions of the market, their dominance is 
dependent upon the next releases of their franchise. Their next blockbuster hit in 2017 was received 
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with some mixed reactions. Financially speaking, it was a success in generating profit and boosting 
company performance, but it was still not enough to sate the appetite of its customers. The author 
argues that for the moment, EA enjoys their high performance but it may not last due to customer 
dissatisfaction. The evidence is the continuous loss of market share and limited number of products 
offered in the interval between 2013 and 2015. EA’s 2015 annual report speaks of their new product 
lines and the continuation of their famous franchises. EA did follow through with their promise by 
offering new products and they were relatively successful.  
The next item on the list is the diversification of products. In this case, EA has the upper 
hand and Activision has a weaker position. The author will stand by the comments in the previous 
paragraph -Activision has performed better, but it will be a matter of time before Activision’s 
customers’ enthusiasm deplete due to the company´s  specialization in one genre. EA in contrast 
have always looked for a wide variety of genres for entertainment products, platforms in case of 
hardware and different methods of distribution.  
Independence of the music and visual studios is vital to their products. Both of these 
companies have equally explored this option. The availability of a strong legal department is also 
crucial for these companies, which both have attested thoroughly.  
Activision and EA are operating in a very customer-driven industry and suppliers have a lot of 
power over these companies, especially the complementary goods that are hardware platforms. It is 
essential for these two companies to have access to excess cash on their balance sheets. Both of 
these companies’ accrued sufficient amounts of cash and one could make an argument that a major 
drop in Activision’s wealth is due to costs and investments; the author argues that it has dropped 
below their historical norm. For more detail, refer to the financial analysis of this chapter.  
As the author mentioned earlier, this niche is highly creative. This nature of the industry works 
in favor of Activision as it can have a multinational base and benefit from a wide range of 
international workers with different perspectives. EA is lagging behind; it has thus far delivered an 
excellent counterbalance to Activision.  
When it comes to threats facing both organizations, they have both managed themselves well 
and their behavior can be categorized as “stabilization”. Stabilization means growth for the company 
and their shareholders. The weaknesses identified for both of these companies are uneven balance 
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of cash flows, dependency on licensing, low employee morale and productivity, limited product 
diversification, aggressive acquisition rather than intrinsic growth, excessive equity.  
A major source of concern for Activision is their uneven balance of cash flow. These 
companies can operate years before they release one of their major franchises. This strategy, whether 
sought or unsought, has caused massive cash flow influxes in some years and often very low or zero 
influx in others. This weakness is unique to Activision. When we look at their financial statements 
presented further in this chapter, a spike in 2012 catches our attention only to be consumed in 
coming years. Meanwhile EA has generated a rather steady flow of influx.  
By contrast, EA suffers from lack of employee morale. In previous chapters, the author 
mentioned a story written by a whistleblower who gave us a snap picture of the company at work. 
Lack of moral may not be evident in financial statements, but it is occurring beneath the surface, 
preventing companies from taking advantage of their full potential.  
Another source of equally important weakness for both of these companies is their aggressive 
approach to mergers and acquisitions. Both of these companies have exhibited a pattern of 
purchases and adding external franchise when they are deemed relevant for their business. One of 
the basic company valuation concepts warns the corporate world not to rely too much on mergers 
(Koller, 2005). The author recognizes the arguments made against this case. If enough industry 
leaders and other players in the market follow a practice, it ceases to be unwise and will be 
normalized. This normalization happens regardless of theoretical or academic inconsistencies.  
Another weakness presented in Appendix V is excessive equity. While this practice can be 
considered safe from an investor’s perspective, it is costly to expand the company on the basis of 
equity rather than debt. (Koller, 2005) Equity has an indirect cost, which signals to the market, 
which could deteriorate the company’s value, but it has an immediate impact. A debit is only 
burdened by its cash outflow and often managerial costs regarding another signal to the market. To 
counter this, Electronic Arts has a policy of not paying any dividends. Electronic Arts has never paid 
their investors and according to their latest annual report of 2016, it is unlikely to pay any dividends 
in the “foreseeable future”. The plowback of money is very good for the value of the company. 
While it is important not to leverage a company beyond the point of no return, it is also crucial not 
to burden the company with excessive debt.  
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6.2 Organizational Structure 
This section is solely focused on the organizational structure of the two companies and what 
the implications of differences amongst the two are. An “organizational structure defines how 
activities such as task allocations, coordination and supervision are directed towards the achievement 
of organizational aim” (Pugh, 2007).  
6.2.1 Electronic Arts 
Typically, the organizational structure can be based upon the functionality of departments (as 
is the case with Siemens) or it can be based upon geographical locations and then a sub-hierarchy of 
functional divisions. The companies will usually pick the structure that is most suitable to their core 
value generation drivers. Gargantuan multinational companies usually opt for a combination of these 
two structures, which can be less efficient, as an additional middle manager will be added for further 
control of the processes. There are various suitable methods including Matrix structure for giant 
conglomerates such as EA. Earlier in the introduction we mentioned that EA underwent a massive 
overhaul and has created “labels” for their products. Underneath each label, business units are 
strategically dispersed throughout the world and the North American continent. There are two 
distinct labels: EA games and EA sports. Under EA games label the following divisions are held: EA 
Los Angeles, EA Montreal, EA Black Box, EA Phenomic, DICE, Criterion Games, and Visceral 
Games. All of the abovementioned have independent marketing, design, managerial and accounting 
departments. The second label is EA Sports. Much like the EA games, it holds several autonomous 
departments under its label.  
There is a third, less-known, administrative label which is composed of two divisions at the 
top of this conglomerate - “Central Development Services” and “Global Publishing”. Both of these 
are responsible for creating a general direction for the company and a more centralized control over 
the labels. The Global Publishing label has given  specific mandate for strategic planning, field 
marketing, sales and distribution in Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America.  
This structure cannot be found in any textbook as it is tailored to EA’s needs, but the 
structure follows central guidelines with autonomous departments.   
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6.2.2 Activision Blizzard 
Activision grew from a small startup in the field and carved its way into the world of 
multinational giants. They still carry their heritage from their previous years. Activision has more 
centralized corporate governance in comparison to EA. Under the office of CEO, departments are 
organized according to their functionality with departments such as customer relations, legal, 
strategy, marketing, etc. All these departments are responsible for performing their respective tasks 
on aggregate level. Thus, it can be categorized as a tall pyramid. Only some of the departments are 
geographically dispersed throughout the world. Otherwise the departments follow the strategy 
guidelines with less autonomy.  
It is important to mention that EA is an older company and is dealing with more products 
than Activision.   
6.3 Financial Analysis 
In this section we will analyze both of these companies’ internal policies. Financial analyses of 
both of these companies are based on their consolidated financial statements published in their 
annual reports.  
6.3.1 Net Worth Analysis 
The calculation method for enterprise value is subject to accounting and financial practices; 
practices about which experts often disagree. The author has presented the net worth tables in 
Appendix III. The figure below summarizes the net worth of these companies.  
Figure 4: Company net worth (EA left, Activision right, Millions, USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
$1 252 177,45  









Company Net Worth Analysis
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Each method has its own advantages and drawbacks. Thus, the author has presented the 
method average in figure four. According to the numbers calculated, EA has a better stand on the 
net worth compared to Activision. The author will note that Activision is undertaking massive 
investment projects and EA is just about to offer its new blockbuster product to the market in 2017.  
6.3.2 Overall Financial Indicators     
In this subsection the author concludes his findings based on hard data which is presented in 
Appendix VI of this document. The majority of this section is based on ratios, which are reflective 
of income or balance sheet items.  
6.3.2.1 Liquidity Ratios  
These ratios are very popular in financial industries. The concept behind this ratio is whether 
a company’s short-term assets (cash, cash equivalence, marketable securities, receivables and 
inventory) are readily available to pay off its short-term liabilities (notes payable, current portion of 
term debt, payables, accrued expenses, and taxes).  
6.3.2.2 Current Ratio 
The ratio is calculated by using ‘current assets/current liabilities’. The higher the ratio the 
better it is for the company. It implies higher assets to offset the company’s short term debt.  
Figure 5: Current Ratio 
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As we can see in the figure above, EA has managed to keep their liability down which is 
good news for their investors. Furthermore, we see a decrease in 2012-2013 which was due to 
investments in their hardware and in two years it began to pay off. The author would like to point 
out that EA has managed to keep their current ratio relatively stable. The picture is significantly 
different when we look at Activision’s performance. In year 2014, their liabilities exceeded their 
assets. It is not a particularly alarming feature of this industry. The author acknowledges that such 
massive spikes in their current ratio may cause instability to their cash flow. In 2015 Activision had 
1.79 assets over their liabilities, while EA had almost twice over their current liability which makes 
them attractive for investments.  
6.3.2.3  Acid Test  
 The quick ratio sometimes referred to as acid test is a liquidity indicator that further refines 
the current ratio by measuring the amount of the most liquid current assets which are used to cover 
current liabilities. The quick ratio is more conservative than the current ratio, because it excludes 
inventory and other current assets, which are more difficult to be sold and turned into cash. It is 
defined as ‘cash + cash equivalents +short term investments + accounts receivable / current 
liability’. As this ratio gets bigger, companies become more liquid.  
Figure 6: Acid Test 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
0,96 
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As is clearly reflected on, EA is obviously a company that is in long term and often illiquid 
assets, which makes it more susceptive to shocks. By contrast, Activision is a company with twice as 
many liquid assets than current assets, which makes this company more stable in shocks.  
6.3.3 Profitability Indicators 
The following section of this report discusses the different measure of corporate profitability 
and financial performance. These ratios provide a good understanding of how well the company is 
utilizing its resources in generating profit and shareholder value. The long term profitability of a 
company is a vital component here. 
6.3.3.1 Net Profit Margin 
In the consolidated income statement, there are four levels of profit or profit margins. These 
include gross profit, operating profit, pretax profit and net profit. Profit margin analysis uses the 
percentage calculation to provide a measure of a company’s profitability on a historical basis and in 
comparison to peer companies and industry benchmarks.  
Figure 7: Profit Margin 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
The author presents two separate calculations of “Operating Margin” which is derived from 
operating profit / net sales. This ratio gives a clear picture of the companies’ profit generated by the 
operating side of the company and not the financial investments. As our companies are operating in 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EA Net Gross Margin 58% 61% 63% 71% 77%
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the IT industry, they both have reasonably little incentive to invest in financial assets. EA has 
generated a steady stream of income which is a process useful for the investors while Activision is 
quite different. We see a steady stream that suddenly hammered down to negative values. The 
author argues that Activision’s rate of recovery has been slow, which could cost the company in the 
long run.  
Figure 8: Revenues (In millions, USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Figure 9: Comparison Net Profit (In millions, USD) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ACTVI Revenue 4 755 4 856 4 583 4 408 4 664
EA Revenue 3 589 4 143 3 797 3 575 4 515
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Source: Author’s calculations  
The author would like to direct the attention to the Net profit and revenues. It is clear that 
Activision is a profitable company overall, but when we consider Net profit, which is profit after 
taxes; we realize that it might be the lack of company’s tax evasion that caused this massive 
difference. As we mentioned before, Activision is subject to various tax jurisdictions, both in the 
United States and in Europe, while EA is primarily American-based. While it does have various 
offices and studios across the globe, it is subject to one tax code; creating a more effective and 
unified tax evasion effort.  
6.3.3.2 Net Profit 
The second measure used was the net profit. This margin captures the portion of the sales in 
the firms’ total income. We can see an increase, as illustrated in figure 9 for EA, which is 
commendable, however, we will discuss in the following sections that this increase is not solely 
reliant on competitive marketing techniques and cutting edge innovations which are attributed to 
EA. It is also not solely due to good tax evasion policy.  
Effective Tax Rate 
This ratio is a measurement of the company’s tax rate, which is calculated by comparing its 
income tax expense to its pretax income. This amount will often differ from the company’s stated 
jurisdictional rate due to many accounting factors, including foreign exchange provisions. This 
effective tax rate gives a food understanding of the tax the company faces.  
Figure 10: Effective tax rates 
 
16,11% 
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Source: Author’s calculations  
As the author concluded earlier, EA benefits from a good tax strategy. EA’s effective tax rate 
is far lower than Activision’s paid amount. It is important to point out that EA had a downsizing 
which took place in 2011. The second reason is increase in liabilities which has shown an increase 
from 2011 onwards.  
6.3.3.3 Return on Assets 
This is a very standard ratio calculated worldwide in an effort to understand how much of the 
returns are captured by assets. It is very simple to calculate as Net income / total assets.  
Figure 11: Return on Assets 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
ROA shows how efficiently a company uses its resources and more specifically assets. In this 
case the author is unable to make a clear judgment. Activision had a massive drop in its net profit 
and rocketed taxes. While this might be a direct effort, the author argues that the drop was massive 
enough to hammer this ratio down for Activision. EA has shown very little volatility and growth on 
average compared to the competitor benchmark.  
Return on Equity 
This ratio illustrates how much the shareholder managed to take from the company’s overall 
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Figure 12: Return on Equity 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
We can clearly see that EA had returns on equity of 17% in 2015 while Activision had only 
5% in the same time interval. We observe the pattern yet again. EA generates more stable indicators 
while Activision fluctuates over time. The author will acknowledge that both of these numbers are 
consistent with their company’s respective targets and for conglomerates of their size. It might 
arouse some suspicion that 15% return may be over exaggerated. The author will present the return 
on invested capital ratio which validates the answer above.  
Figure 13: Return on Invested Capital 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
ROIC is a useful indicator for the financial analysis. While numbers are different, the trend is 
fairly visible. The author concludes that Return on Equity has been high for shareholders of EA. 























2 0 1 1  2 0 1 2  2 0 1 3  2 0 1 4  2 0 1 5  
EA ROIC ACTVI ROIC
Internal Assessment 38 
 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Here, the author is facing a dilemma. EA is historically a 
company that does not hand out dividends, while Activision distributes this money on yearly basis. 
While it might not appear as a motivation factor for investors, the author argues that reinvestment 
of dividend into the company is often more proffered by institutional investors that will value their 
portfolio by enterprise value, not the amount of dividends paid. Many investors prefer to have this 
type of corporate strategy while others might prefer a model used by Activision. Activision has 
lower share price and high number of shares and gives dividends on consecutive basis. This might 
be seen as a strain on the company for the institutional investors.  
Calculation of WACC requires several components, one of which is the dividend payout. As 
we have discussed earlier, EA does not pay any dividends. Measurement of WACC can be calculated 
in a number of ways depending on the standard being employed. In this case, company’s WACC 
against ROIC would not be valid as it is not an apt comparison. The author deems it to be a false 
equivalency and rejects its results on principle.  
6.3.4 Debt Ratios  
6.3.4.1 Debt to Equity Ratio 
The ratio indicates the amount of debt divided by the equity as one would suspect. This ratio 
gives an insight into the company’s leverage. This measure states how much the creditors are willing 
to provide credit and in turn, how much the shareholders are willing to commit to this company.  
Figure 14: Debt to Equity 
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Here we observe another difference in the corporate governance of the two companies. As 
discussed earlier in the Internal Factor Evaluation Matrix, EA is more comfortable with equity 
rather than debt. In the occasion when EA increases its debt obligations, it is always raised via debt 
instrument that is convertible to equity. On five year average, EA’s gearing was two percent (2%) 
which is very small compared to its rival which is 19%. This gives a very good signal to the investor 
that EA is usually looking inwards for additional finds but it is not without its drawbacks. This is 
another instance when the meanings of the financial ratios are being twisted by corporate strategy.  
6.3.4.2 Debt Cover Ratio 
 Another important ratio under the heading of debt is debt ratio or debt service coverage 
which is calculated as EBITDA/Net Debt. The ratio is a popular benchmark used in the 
measurement of an entity’s ability to produce enough cash to cover its debt (including lease) 
payments.  
Figure 15: Debt Coverage 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
The interpretation of this ratio for this industry is tricky. Conventional wisdom holds that the 
higher this ratio, the easier it is for company to obtain a loan. (David, 2009), while in reality, a 
company like EA is very conservative when it comes to debt and debt service. They prefer to have it 
converted to stocks. Therefore, their ratio is very close to zero while Activision shows a significantly 
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6.3.4.3 Interest Coverage Ratio 
In this part we will analyze how easy it is for both of these companies to pay their respective 
debts. As mentioned before, the two companies work in a constantly evolving environment with 
higher amounts of uncertainty. Appendix VI documents the findings regarding this matter. Both of 
these companies are very capable of paying their debts. The author, however, would argue that EA 
is highly unlikely to take on debt, due to its conservative attitude towards it.  
6.3.4.4 Cash Flow to Debt Ratio  
When comparing the company’s level of debt to other performance measures, one of the 
most widely used ratios is cash glow to debt which includes Operating cash flow / total debt. This 
ratio gives a picture of whether the company is able to pay back all of its debt using current yearly 
cash flow which is a rational expectation for creditors.  
Table 1: Cash Flow to Debt Ratio 
 2013 2014 2015 
Cash flow to debt Ratio, Activision 45% -144% 7% 
Cash flow to debt Ratio, EA 75% 44% 40% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Here we can see that EA was able to repay to 40% of its obligations in 2015 while Activision 
was able repay only 7%. It is important to mention that Activision’s 2014 net cash was the source of 
the negative value in the table above. This number (7%) stands out from the rest of its previous 
years. Although this anomaly might appear to be a relatively small number when compared to a 
conservative company such as EA, it is still considered very good for the fluctuations that this 
company has endured, especially considering the deflationary pressures incumbent in Europe during 
the timeline presented in the table above.  
6.3.5 Cash Flow Indicators 
This section analyzes cash flow indicators, which focus on the cash being generated in 
conjunction with operations and, furthermore, the safety net that it provides for the company. These 
ratios can give researchers another window into the companies’ financial wellbeing and overall 
performance.  
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6.3.5.1 Operating Cash Flow 
This ratio which is expressed as a percentage compares a company’s operating cash flow to 
its net sales which gives investors an idea of the company’s ability to turn sales into cash. Positive 
and negative changes in the company’s terms of sales and/or the collection of experience of its 
accounts receivable will show up in this indicator. It is calculated as operating cash flow / net sales. 
The author acknowledges that the item used for calculation is revenue. This is due to necessity, as 
neither of these companies reports their respective net sales specifically.  
Figure 16: Operating Cash Flow 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
The illustration gives a clear picture that in 2015; EA had more opportunities to turn sales 
into cash. It is important to recognize that the negative value does not correspond with the 
company’s inability to turn sales into cash, but rather cash outflow for a wide variety of reasons, 
some of which have been discussed previously, such as taxes levied, dividend outflow and debt 
obligations. Thus far the author has provided evidence of Activisions’s lack of providing positive 
ROA and tax evasion techniques, which caused their cash flow to be significantly negative and 
placed the company in a predicament.  
6.3.5.2 Cash Coverage 
Although this ratio has little to do with operating cash flow, it is still important to mention it 
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Figure 17: Cash Ratio 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
We can see that EA held enough cash and cash equivalent to cover approximately half of 
their liabilities in 2015. The growth in general trend of EA is a good sign for creditors. EA can cover 
half of its liabilities with cash. As mentioned before, EA’s conservative approach to raising money is 
reflected in the figure above. Activision shows signs of volatility which confirms the author’s earlier 
suspicion that the company is more liquid. EA has shown more stability in regards to financial 
indicators which is more appetizing to its investors.  
6.3.6 Volatility of Stocks  
In this section, the author will analyze the volatility of stocks for both of the companies 
indicated earlier.  
The author will include several models to uncover measures which will be discussed in 
upcoming subchapters. The data used in this section is the publicly available adjust close (Adj Close) 
stock price on exchange. The methodology, testing and immediate model are included but are not 
presented in main text. The mentioned topics are included in Appendix VII of this document. The 
author specifically chose not to include any figure after May 2016. This month was the official mark 
of the beginning of the presidential election cycle which was highly volatile, given the nature of the 
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ideology, as the party took control of all branches of the United States federal government. 
Anticipation of a corporate tax cut had a soft effect on stock prices. This effect would have been 
captured by VAR model and will taint the purpose of this study. This range could have been used 
for TARCH and GARCH modeling, but the author opted out for the sake of uniformity. 
6.3.6.1 GARCH Modeling    
In this subsection, the author will analyze volatility with its closest proxy of an asset’s risk. 
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, we can anticipate the presence of a strong 
relationship between risk and expected return of a stock. Therefore, predicting volatility is very 
important for investors. The second part of this analysis will employ forecasting of mean (average) 
use Vector Auto Regression.  
The pain purpose of this section is to model the volatility of Electronic Arts, which is the 
historical stock price of Electronic Arts during 1990-2016. The author will analyze volatility and its 
predictability. In particular, we are interested in finding the best method for modeling the volatility 
of prices.  
The mechanics of Generalized Heteroscedastic Auto Regressive (GARCH), including 
methodology and detailed resulted, are documented in Appendix VII. Even though the evidence 
was not strongly in favor of fitting the ARIMA and GARCH family (implying weak GARCH effect), 
we estimated the model and the results are as follows.  
All the parameters that influence the volatility of our stock are statistically significant. The 
long term variance does not influence the volatility significantly. An estimate for a change in variable 
alpha one is 0.35. And the estimate for previous forecast for beta one is almost twice as powerful 
with a coefficient of 0.85. When we add up these two coefficients, the result is less than one which is 
an indication of reverting variance process. (Unconditional error variance = 0.00414924).  
In order to capture the leverage effect in our dataset we proceed further to TARCH (1,1) 
(Zakoian & Rabemananjara, 1993) 
Unlike our analysis in GARCH (1,1) the coefficient estimate for the constant (omega) is not 
close to zero, however, in TARCH (1,1) we can see that the previous period volatility is slightly 
larger than in the GARCH model. The coefficient estimate of Gama is different from zero and is 
significant, which indicates the presence of the asymmetry effect and volatility being affected 
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considerably by negative shocks. It is prudent to mention that despite the significance of asymmetry, 
it does not explain the volatility in our data.  
Another model that accounts for the asymmetric news effect is GJR-GARCH (Glosten, et 
al., 1993). The reasoning behind this model is such that bad news has higher impact than good news. 
We will use GJR-GARCH (1,1) in order to capture this effect. The result of this analysis is 
documented in Appendix VII. The obtained estimates from fitting GJR-GARCH (1,1) into our data 
are significant. It is important to note that much like TARCH, the omega (constant) is not 
significant. The asymmetry effect captured by gamma is positive but slightly lower than TARCH 
(1,1). 
After comparing the GARCH family of models, the author concludes that GARCH (1,1) can 
explain the volatility of the stock returns. The author’s conclusion is supported by the significance of 
all coefficients and given further confirmation by minimum information criterion generated by our 
estimations, which is lowest in case of GARCH (1,1)  
Almost 60% of volatility of returns is explained by the previous forecast, while the other 
40% is due to news impact. We use TARCH (1,1) and GJR-GARCH (1,1) to analyze the asymmetry 
effect. The coefficient estimates of asymmetry parameters in both models are significant and 
positive. This implies that bad news has higher impact than good news. Both TARCH and GJR-
GARCH confirmed the presence of the leverage effect. However the leverage effect is not large, 
which is surprising for a company with Electronic Art’s reputation.  
6.3.6.2 VAR Analysis 
Vector Auto Regression (VAR) is a data-driven model and the historical value of each 
variable plays a role in its future determinants. After performing a sensitivity analysis on a full 
sample and a restrictive sample, the author decided to use the restricted range; excluding the crisis 
years of IT bubble of 2000s, the subprime crisis of 2007 and economic recession of 2009. The new 
data set begins on 07.01.2011 and the last observation is 04.04.2016. The author did not take the 
first difference of data to avoid the loss of long term trends between the two variables. The results 
of the inverse roots are show distinct signs of stationarity. The inverse root is presented in Appendix 
VII.  
We have chosen NASDAQ 100 index in connection with our company. EA is a fortune 500 
company and enlisted on NASDAQ 100 stock index. Thus we conclude that these are relationships 
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between our index and our variable. Furthermore, there is a clear relationship in reverse. The 
company performance will contribute to the value of NASDAQ 100. It might be argued that our 
company is in absolute minority, but the author believes that it may still effect because Electronic 
Arts is an industry leader. Other companies closely follow its business model and, indeed, it was the 
EA business model that shaped the industry.  
The VAR output is also documented in Appendix VII. VAR models are often used for 
forecasting, because they are good in predicting the mean. The ordering of data is critical when 
constructing VAR. Our first dependent variable is NASDAQ index and the second variable is the 
company stock. The result of the forecast is presented in Appendix VII. It is suggested that the 
company’s stock prices will remain steady in the near future.  
Another well-known feature of the VAR models is their impulse response function and 
analysis. According to our findings, if there is an exogenous shock to stock of the company, it will 
lose a significant portion of it in the first day and it bounces back to the original value assuming the 
shock is not persistent. Even after assuming a non-persistent shock, we observe little persistence on 
the fifth day. This is attributed to the initial volatility which will cause stock price to plummet at 
0.014%. This suggests vulnerability of the company (see figure 28 of Appendix VII). 
Electronic Art’s persistence suggests a healthy and sound financial structure within the 
company.   
It is often recommended that these measures be held in comparison to the industry average. 
The author has made various attempts to construct the data set for an apt, objective and fair 
comparison. The author has concluded that the company’s main competitors hold a distinct 
advantage over EA. Nintendo, mentioned in earlier chapters, has its own hardware platform and the 
advantage of offering a supplementary good to their customers, enjoying a pool of captive 
consumers. Ubisoft is a French based software company that is holding its stocks in a foreign 
currency (Euro), which is considered adequate for this comparison. Activision is another fair and apt 
comparison for the purposes of this analysis. The other two remaining competitors of EA are 
Microsoft and Sony. Both of these giant conglomerates offer a wide variety of often complementary 
and supplementary products. Due to their wide variety of products, the stock prices are distorted by 
synergy created from other business divisions.  
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While the author has been able to identify other competitors worldwide, it is not 
recommended to pursue this analysis. An industry analysis cannot take a handful of companies into 
account while ignoring 76% of market share in total revenues. The author does not believe this 
analysis would hold any merit. 
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6.3.7 Crisis Management     
This section is solely dedicated to understanding EA’s underlying strategy in times of crisis 
during the Subprime mortgage crisis. As an S&P 100 company, EA is expected to have better insight 
into financial markets. The executives might have access to privileged information that is not 
accessible to the public. While this intriguing argument might be true, the author cannot confirm the 
existence of such information. The author has thus relied on the behavior of the company as 
recorded in written public statements. The author was presented a choice to study baseline operation 
of the company and its performance during the crisis or to study strategic managerial decisions. The 
author chose the former. The choice was made for the sake of consistency.  
In this subsection, the author will use the discounted cash flow model to analyze the 
behavior of the firm during crisis. To do so, the author has created an artificial forecast for the year 
of 2008 and 2009. This forecast is generated by the previous three consecutive years (i.e. 2005, 2006, 
and 2007). The author has calculated the company’s internal rate of growth which is presented in 
Appendix II. This growth rate is used to project the future consolidated balance sheet and statement 
of operations. The author will be able to provide a clear analysis with a certain degree of scientific 
certainty.  
6.3.7.1 Statement of Operations (Income statement)  
After a careful cross-examination of artificial statements with actual statements presented in 
Appendix IIX, the author has concluded the following. 
Demand fell in the years following the Subprime crisis which hit middle income households 
that are major customers of EA. The income statement did not reflect this assertion completely.  
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Figure 18: Gross profit for 2008-09 (Millions USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
The table above represents the gross profit of the firm. The first three years were taken as 
presented in income statement with no alterations as a benchmark. The years following were taken 
as a comparison with its respective forecast. As expected, in the year following the subprime crisis 
gross profit fell down, but not significantly. More puzzlingly, the forecast and actual values converge 
in 2009. Upon further examination, the author concluded that the sufficient increase of the revenue 
component was the main reason for the trajectory of this graph.  
During the same period, the company increased its expenditure size far beyond the projected 
values.  
Figure 19: Total Operating expenses 2008-09 (Millions USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual $1 932 $1 770 $1 879 $1 860 $2 085









2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual $1 263 $1 445 $1 840 $2 243 $2 520
Forecast $1 263 $1 445 $1 840 $1 932 $2 028
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The company had a stagnating backlash on its income as they shrank below zero and 
operating income turned to loss.  
6.3.7.2 Balance Sheet 
In this subsection, the author will conduct the same analysis for the company’s balance 
sheet. As expected, the loss in revenue took its toll on retained earnings. While it was still above 
zero, it took a massive downturn following the events of the subprime mortgage crisis, departing 
from its stable trend.  
Figure 20: Retained Earnings 2008-2009 (Millions USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
While indicators fall to alarmingly low levels, it does not affect the company’s bottom line. 
Upon further investigation of the balance sheet, the author has uncovered additional entries that 
were previously unmentioned. An entry dedicated to “Income tax obligations” which was added in 
2008, and another entry “Acquisition related intangibles”. The company’s liabilities increased in 2007 
by acquiring VG holding group and its subsidiaries. It was reported in USA Today (Wong, 2007) 
that EA had its largest acquisition of the year, which was later confirmed by their 2008 and 2009 
reports. The company did take a massive hit, but the source was not a lack of sales or lack of 
demand; it was due to their internal decisions to acquire a large holding to take advantage of low 
cost of borrowing at the time.  
Interactive software still remains a luxury good, as its primary function is to entertain. Seeing 
that the figures did not reflect the crisis as it was reported creates an enigma for the author which 
will be addressed in conclusion of this thesis.  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual $2 005 $2 241 $2 323 $1 888 $800
Forecast $2 005 $2 241 $2 323 $2 439 $2 560
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6.4 Internal Factor Evaluation        
“This strategy-formulation tool summarizes and evaluates the major strengths and weaknesses 
in the functional areas of a business, and it also provides a basis for identifying and evaluating 
relationships among those areas” (David, 2009) 
In this section, the author will use a previously obtained SWOT matrix and attempt to 
establish a relationship between strengths and weaknesses. As discussed previously, EA has a strong 
financial position which can be attributed their conservative approach towards debt. This strong 
financial position can compensate and, eventually, overturn their possible decline in net worth 
observed in historical stock market data.  
EA’s diverse profile of products and industry position can compensate for their limited 
hardware capabilities until such a time when the company takes a massive overhaul of their hardware 
structure. This change took place in 2017 using their new “Frost Bite” engine.  
While the company’s independence of music and visual studios are considered an advantage, 
EA’s greatest threat will come from vital dependency on licensing its products.   
A diverse profile of employees is often an advantage of a large corporation, but in the case of 
EA, it is combined with massive tasks carried out by business units which may create tension in the 
work place. EA needs to address this issue and make a firm stance for its employees.  
A strong R&D position, market dominance and industry leadership all put EA on a pedestal 
of incredible opportunity. The author believes this strength is greatly overshadowed by the 
company’s lack of intrinsic growth and turning to outside franchises for growth.  
As for external environment, environmental regulations and movements to heavily regulate 
the industry are profound compared to the previous years. The author is convinced that the most 
significant threat coming from external environment is digital piracy. This issue needs to be tackled 
on a national level. Electronic Arts and similar companies will suffer consequences unless they find 
sophisticated means by which they could increase the encryption of their products.  
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6.5 Space Matrix  
This is a great four by four matrix to determine the exact location of the company in response 
to its competitors and market at large.  “The axes of Space Matrix represent two internal dimensions 
(Financial Position [FP] and competitive position [CP]) and two external dimensions (stability 
position [SP] and industry position [IP]). (David, 2009) Appendix IX documents the space matrix in 
great detail.  
Though this matrix is very subjective in construction, the author has created a framework 
based on the findings presented in earlier chapters. The author has placed higher emphasis on 
financial indicators.  
The space matrix has four dimensions. When it comes to the company’s overall policy, the 
company can be “conservative”,  characterized by inward growth, market penetration, and product 
development. While EA has shown a conservative pattern in regards to debt, it is relatively small 
compared to the other side (M&A) of the matrix.  
A company may be “defensive”, characterized by retrenchment, divesture and liquidation. So 
far, no financial or managerial metric has suggested this pattern in EA. 
A company may be “Aggressive”, by the use of integration (backward, forward, and 
horizontal), market penetration, product development and divesture.  While EA does not engage in 
unrelated diversification, its behavior is very typical of an aggressive company. It’s great mergers and 
acquisitions are textbook examples of horizontal integration, aimed at gaining a stronger industry 
position and external growth.  
Another measure in the matrix is “Competitive”, which is characterized by the same measures 
as “Aggressive”. The key difference is that such activities have greater emphasis on stability and 
internal growth. EA’s corporate behavior does resemble and scores high on the “SP” metric 
explained earlier; the behavior observed is too aggressive. This aggressiveness is so high that it 
overshadows the majority of their competitive behavior.  
Hence the author concludes that EA is an aggressive company with focus on external growth, 
trying to distinguish itself in industry positioning while placing explicit emphasis on growth and 
taking out competitive forces.  
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6.6 Value generation 
EA is among the IT industry incumbents, a software creation company which focus on 
interactive and entertainment software development. “The [nature of] IT industry is inherently a 
creative industry in which value generation comes from actually creating something new.” (Spitzer, 
2010). Eliot Spitzer, the former governor of New York said in the sentence above what many 
textbooks explain in chapters. In the case of EA, the value generation comes from meeting the 
demands and building up on the progress which the company has made in the previous years.  
Due to piracy and other inherent challenges in IT industry, EA has turned to unorthodox 
methods at times, such as investing in its online servers, and trying to offer their products via 
internet simultaneously or to have increased spending on development of mobile apps, specifically 
intended for smartphones. This reduces one burden and replaced it with another. Now EA is also 
dependent on internet providing companies and on its latest trends, smart phone developers and 
their respective operating systems. The 2015 and 2016 reports clearly signal the actions taken to 
increase their investments and increase  their presence in the market.  
When it comes to value generation, EA has exhibited behavior of absorbing successful 
companies into its nest via acquisition. The strategy has a long history and now is considered a 
typical norm of the industry.  
While the value creation is not obvious enough in the case of an acquisition (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1988), it does attract a lot of investors. It also prevents risk to a certain extent by cherry 
picking the success EA is looking for in their portfolio.  
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6.7 Brand Strategy 
Like any company, EA puts a lot of effort in terms of labor and financial resources into their 
image. EA’s core of business is mostly dependent on the intellectual property that is highly 
correlated to copyright laws. These rights are either explicitly or practically not enforced by every 
country, which places such companies at a disadvantage.  
EA has placed a lot of effort in customer loyalty and, in a sense, legacy when it comes to 
sports and sport management simulations. The only name that offers a valuable product is EA’s 
long standing divisions - EA Sports. Regardless of customer sentiment, the company legacy 
resonates with their type of simulations. EA also own one of the largest franchises through its 
Bioware under EA Montréal. This department is also another one of the names that brings massive 
customer loyalty to the mix. There are more examples of such franchises purchased, nurtured and 
coalesce with the name Electronic Arts brand. For more examples refer to Appendix XI. 
EA’s brand was recently tarnished with a slew of criticism in their joint venture with Disney. 
The author will acknowledge the conflict is ongoing and is unable to comment on specifics. 
As the company has a lot of intangible assets, EA also has a very large legal department that is 
often too aggressive. EA’s main brand strategy is typical for the industry - observation of the market 





In the final chapter, the author will conclude and reconcile his finds with his own interpretation of 
the strategy of Electronic Arts. They author analyzed a case study of a widely known interactive 
software developer with its primary focus on middle class consumers. The company has strengths 
and weakness as brought forth in this thesis. The analysis began with a history and origins of the 
company that started its pursuit as a union of artists and its evolution into the corporate world. 
We have touched every single aspect of the managerial metric that could be quantified. The 
author has found the environment of interactive development companies engaged. It is highly 
supplier-driven (hardware) and customer-driver on the other side. Companies do have the luxury of 
choosing a specific corporate strategy, but rather observing the market and adjust accordingly. As 
software developers, EA has a mandate to meet the demands of its young customers on every turn 
and it must outperform its previous milestone while maintaining a competitive position in the 
market. The industry behaves in rather an odd fashion. While many academic texts openly 
discourage mergers and acquisitions as mentioned by David 2009or consider them to be tricky at 
times and harmful to the stocks and shareholders (Koller, et al., 2005), it’s a practice widely  used in 
this niche of the IT industry.  
As for the managerial perspective, the company has performed under a long termed strategy 
that has been carried out by various CEOs. EA has number of challenges ahead from regulators, 
activists and the public at large. Thus far the company has been able to tackle those issues with the 
help of its large legal team or public relations department. The company has some hostile, negative 
publicity from various sources that has been pointed out by the author. While there is no “one size 
fits all” solution when it comes to management, EA has shown their aggressive business model 
works best and many companies such as Activision, which was used for benchmarking in parts of 
this thesis, have been adopting this strategy. EA is an extremely aggressive company when it comes 
to market strategy.  
As for financial indicators, we see a vivid and distinct pattern. The company exhibits a very 
conservative approach when it comes to matters relating to debt. The dislike of debt causes the 
company to keep very low levels of (convertible) debt. While the company has a large base of cash 
and cash equivalence, it has never paid any dividends and according to their 2016 reports, it is highly 
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unlikely that the company will pay any dividends in the foreseeable future. The decision to plow 
back will create additional value for the company to increase its retained earnings. While the shock 
waves of economic cycle have shown no discrimination, EA has managed to combat the shocks 
with generating stable growing cash flow to the firm. EA is also in a unique position to perform 
cross-company subsidization to its underlings.  
The author is puzzled by the strategic decision of EA during the crisis of 2007. It is safe to 
assume that the executives at EA had access to privileged information and could have drawn the 
same conclusions that in a time where costs of capital had been at historic low (effectively zero), 
many companies would engage in litigations and growth. All these events and other economic 
indicators have point out to the emergence of bubble(s) in the economy. While EA decided to 
proceed with their intention of aggressive growth via acquisition, the company’s financial stance was 
firm enough to withstand the crisis. The analysis of balance sheets reflects that executives either 
ignored the crisis by making an assumption of stable demand, or proceeded with their plans feeling 
confident of their market stance.  
One of the key discoveries in the interactive software niche is that mergers and acquisitions 
had become a fixture in their business model. This can create an addiction to growth in the short 
run at the expense of survival in the long run. The conventional wisdom holds that this is not 
sustainable for long. EA has proved that it is not only sustainable. In fact it does not affect the 
company’s future prospect negatively. The author does not believe that conventional wisdom has 
lost its merit to the modern market but, rather, that the entertainment industry with its industrial 
structure that was explained in detail in chapter four, creates a unique set of circumstances under 
which typical practices of the business can be bent.  
A major part of this thesis was comprehending the volatility and combating the waves of 
economic turmoil. The author concludes that EA’s conservative strategy towards debt in 
conjunction with not paying dividends and plowing back earnings is their sole driver of success in 
combating the 2009 economic recession. The company continued their business operations as usual 
regardless of economic performance. This judgment is made solely on the basis of looking at the 
company’s publicly available books and reports. The executives were convinced that the company 
will jump over the recession and it was not far from the truth.    
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The company’s financial positioning and policy has mostly defused the effect of economic 
cycles. It did not need to show any flexibility in its managerial behavior, because in the described 
industry, EA benefits from an almost monopoly-like position. Contrary to the author’s expectations, 
the company does not focus solely on short-term profit generation but rather long- term, stable, 
growing cash flow to the business. The investors prefer this strategy because it creates and increased 
company value.  
While the author does not agree with all the strategies employed by EA, the author 
acknowledges that the strategies undertaken are adequate to meet the demands of industry. The 
author does recommend a decrease in the use of equity. Equity has various costs associated with its 
creation that will create a signaling effect in the stock market. It might undermine the operations and 
halt business targets. The author stands in sharp contrast to those who are skeptical to acquisition 
with the evidence from an entire industry that capitalizes on acquisitions. High number acquisitions 
do not affect the company’s bottom line. The sustainable growth generated under this system speaks 
for itself. One of the main criticisms that the author does make in regards to this company is their 
game strategy. Based on observation of our sample, the author concludes that the company is 
playing a contemporaneous game. The author believes the goal of the company should not be to 
outperform competitors but to outperform themselves.  
7.1 Contributions 
This thesis provides a clear insight into the interactive software industry. Such vigorous 
analysis has not been done before by the members of academia for this industry. The second 
contribution is uncovering that the success EA has in its field is more due to conservative strategy in 
raising capital. EA prefers equity over debt. This discovery stands in criticism of some within the 
academic community. Thirdly, this study mostly contributes to the literature on Merger and 
Acquisition. EA is a company with a long history of acquisitions. These actions have been criticized 
by many in the field of economics and finance. These actions were proven to make no change to the 
company’s bottom line. Aggressive acquisition policy is not as toxic as the author initially perceived 
and it can be contributed to the special circumstances in the industry, but the author is convinced 
otherwise. Judging by the thirty-five years of successful operations as of 2018, the author reasons 
that this company is a clear example that mergers and acquisitions are a sustainable strategy for this 
industry.                 
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Appendix I: Competitive Profile Matrix 
  
Electronic Arts Inc. Activision Blizzard Inc. 
Critical Factors Weights Rating Score Rating Score 
Advertising 0.05 3 0.15 3 0.15 
Market Penetration 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.05 
Customer Service 0.15 1 0.15 3 0.45 
Store Locations 0 2 0 2 0 
R&D 0.16 4 0.64 3 0.48 
Employee Dedication 0.1 2 0.2 2 0.2 
Operating Profit 0.1 4 0.4 4 0.4 
Customer Loyalty 0.1 2 0.2 4 0.4 
Market Share 0.05 2 0.1 3 0.15 
Product Quality 0.12 2 0.24 2 0.24 
Top Management 0.1 3 0.3 3 0.3 
Price Competitiveness 0.02 3 0.06 2 0.04 
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Appendix II: EA Growth Rate 
 2005 2006 2007 
Income tax $            221 $      147 $       66 
Net Income $            504 $      236 $        76 
Effective Tax rate 12.94% 9.50% 4.22% 
EBIT(1-tax rate) 1,708 1,548 1,564 
Long-term debt $               - $        - $        - 
Shareholder´s equity $         3,498 $   3,408 $   4,032 
Total capital 
   
    
Ratio 
   
Retention Rate (RR) $           1.00 $     1.00 $     1.00 
ROIC 50% 47% 42% 
    
Average RR $           0.33 
  
Average ROIC $           0.15 
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Appendix III: Net worth Analysis 
Electronic Arts Inc. 
Stockholders' Equity $11,786.36  
Net Income x 5 $1,299.84  
(Share Price/EPS) x Net Income $2,497,811.80  
Number of Shares Outstanding x Share Price $2,497,811.80  
EA Method Average $1,252,177.45  
      
Activision Blizzard Inc. 
Stockholders' Equity $17,181.59  
Net Income x 5 $3,843.85  
(Share Price/EPS) x Net Income $358.05  
Number of Shares Outstanding x Share Price $3,330,683.24  
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Appendix IV: External Evaluation Matrix. 
Electronic Arts 
Note: Rating 1 is major weakness, Rating 2 is minor weakness, rating 3 is minor strength, and rating 
4 is major strength. 
Opportunities Weight Rating Weighted Score 
Continuous growing demand in the industry 0.05 1 0.05 
Growing demand of the online services 0.05 2 0.1 
Emergence of mobile software 0.1 1 0.1 
Investment in next generation hardware 0.025 3 0.075 
Increase in use of 3D television sets 0.03 1 0.03 
Large pool of skilled workers world wide 0.05 1 0.05 
Emergence of Latin American market 0.05 4 0.2 
Introduction of Virtual reality programs and hardware 0.025 2 0.05 
Capitalization of Brand beyond the incumbent industry 0.01 4 0.04 
Celebrity involvement 0.01 4 0.04 
    
Threats Weight Rating Weighted Score 
Digital Piracy 0.2 3 0.6 
Intense competition in the market 0.05 4 0.2 
Delay in hardware development 0.05 3 0.15 
Licensing of intellectual property 0.1 4 0.4 
Cyber-attacks on company servers 0.03 3 0.09 
Misuse of subscription rights in countries such as China 
and India 
0.05 2 0.1 
Environmental activism against CO2 emission caused by 
mainframes 
0.01 1 0.01 
Negative critical reviews and online rumors 0.05 4 0.2 
Further sales taxation of State 0.04 3 0.12 
Increase in presence of regulatory author 0.02 4 0.08 
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Activision Blizzard 
Opportunities Weight Rating Weighted Score 
Continuous growing demand in the industry 0.05 4 0.2 
Growing demand of the online services 0.05 4 0.2 
Emergence of mobile software 0.1 1 0.1 
Investment in next generation hardware 0.025 3 0.075 
Increase in use of 3D television sets 0.03 2 0.06 
Large pool of skilled workers world wide 0.05 3 0.15 
Emergence of Latin American market 0.05 1 0.05 
Introduction of Virtual reality programs and hardware 0.025 1 0.025 
Capitalization of Brand beyond the incumbent industry 0.01 4 0.04 
Celebrity involvement 0.01 4 0.04 
 
   
Threats Weight Rating Weighted Score 
Digital Piracy 0.2 2 0.4 
Intense competition in the market 0.05 4 0.2 
Delay in hardware development 0.05 2 0.1 
Licensing of intellectual property 0.1 4 0.4 
Cyber-attacks on company servers 0.03 4 0.12 
Misuse of subscription rights in countries such as China 
and India 
0.05 3 0.15 
Environmental activism against CO2 emission caused by 
mainframes 
0.01 3 0.03 
Negative critical reviews and online rumors 0.05 2 0.1 
Further sales taxation of State 0.04 3 0.12 
Increase in presence of regulatory author 0.02 3 0.06 
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Appendix V: Internal Factor Evaluation Matrix 
Electronic Arts 
Strengths Weight Rating 
Weighted 
Score 
Global presence and immense success of EA's franchise 0.1 4 0.4 
Strong financial indicators 0.06 3 0.18 
Strong R&D positioning 0.1 4 0.4 
Industry leader 0.05 3 0.15 
Dominant market position 0.05 2 0.1 
Diversification of franchise  0.01 4 0.04 
Independent ownership of Music and Visual studios 0.05 4 0.2 
Strong legal department 0.05 3 0.15 
Availability of other liquid assets (mainly cash) 0.01 1 0.01 
Diversity of employee profile 0.02 3 0.06 
 
   
Weaknesses Weight Rating 
Weighted 
Score 
Decline in net worth 0.01 1 0.01 
Dependency on licensing 0.2 1 0.2 
Low employee morale and productivity 0.1 4 0.4 
Limited product diversification (software engines) 0.05 1 0.05 
Aggressive acquisition  rather than intrinsic growth 0.1 4 0.4 
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Activision Blizzard 
Strengths Weight Rating 
Weighted 
Score 
Global presence and immense success of Activision's franchise 0.1 4 0.4 
Strong financial indicators 0.06 4 0.24 
Strong R&D positioning 0.1 3 0.3 
Industry leader 0.05 4 0.2 
Dominant market position 0.05 4 0.2 
Diversification of franchise  0.01 1 0.01 
Independent ownership of Music and Visual studios 0.05 3 0.15 
Strong legal department 0.05 3 0.15 
Availability of other liquid assets (mainly cash) 0.01 4 0.04 
Diversity of employee profile 0.02 2 0.04 
 
   
Weaknesses Weight Rating 
Weighted 
Score 
Decline in net worth 0.01 4 0.04 
Dependency on licensing 0.2 1 0.2 
Low employee morale and productivity 0.1 3 0.3 
Limited product diversification (software engines) 0.05 1 0.05 
Aggressive acquisition rather than intrinsic growth 0.1 1 0.1 
Excessive equity 0.04 3 0.12 
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Appendix VI: Financial Analysis 
Electronic Arts 
Figures in Millions of United States Dollars 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Revenues 3,091 3,665 4,212 3,654 3,589 4,143 3,797 3,575 4,515 
CoGS, HW & Third parties 1,212 1,805 2,127 1,866 1,499 1,598 1,388 1,032 1,028 
G&A 288 339 332 320 301 377 354 410 386 
D&A 27 34 58 53 57 43 52 50 3 
Cost, of which 1,527 2,178 2,517 2,239 1,857 2,018 1,794 1,492 1,417 
          
EBIT  1,564 1,487 1,695 1,415 1,732 2,125 2,003 2,083 3,098 
EBT 1,564 1,487 1,695 1,415 1,732 2,125 2,003 2,083 3,098 
Tax declared 138 507 855 706 279 18 41 1 50 
PAT 1,426 980 840 709 1,453 2,107 1,962 2,082 3,048 
Net income 1,274 1,891 3,016 2,529 2,007 1,954 1,766 2,073 1,300 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average 
07/15 
Gross margin 61% 51% 50% 49% 58% 61% 63% 71% 77% 60% 
Net Margin 61% 51% 50% 49% 58% 61% 63% 71% 77% 60% 
EBITDA Margin 51% 42% 42% 40% 50% 52% 54% 60% 69% 51% 
EBIT Margin 51% 41% 40% 39% 48% 51% 53% 58% 69% 50% 
PAT% of sales 46% 27% 20% 19% 40% 51% 52% 58% 68% 42% 
 
Cost Structure Analysis 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average 
07/15 
G&A % of sales 9% 9% 8% 9% 8% 9% 9% 11% 9% 9% 
Salaries % of sales 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
D&A % of sales 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
EBIT % of sales - before Ex. 
Items 
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Capital Efficiency ratios 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average 
07/15 
Net Profit 1,426 980 840 709 1,453 2,107 1,962 2,082 3,048 
 
Equity 3,735 6,078 9,372 12,134 14,261 16,079 17,659 19,911 20,985 
 
ROE 38% 16% 9% 6% 10% 13% 11% 10% 15% 14.28% 
ROA 23% 34% 59% 61% 28% 27% 27% 28% 16% 
 
Tax rate 32.70% 
         
NOPAT 1,564 1,487 1,695 1,415 1,732 2,125 2,003 2,083 3,098 
 
Interest Bearing Liabilities (net) 80 99 99 99 134 716 714 183 697 
 
Invested Capital 3,815 6,177 9,471 12,233 14,395 16,795 18,373 20,094 21,682 
 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cash ratio 0.65 0.59 0.68 0.47 0.48 0.32 0.35 0.49 0.47 
Liquid ratio 1.51 1.40 1.40 1.29 1.45 0.84 0.76 1.38 1.25 
Current ratio 1.57 1.52 1.57 1.37 1.61 0.87 0.78 1.43 1.27 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average 
07/15 
Equity 3,735 6,078 9,372 12,134 14,261 16,079 17,659 19,911 20,985 
 
Net Debt (interest-
bearing debt minus 
excess cash) 
80 99 99 99 134 716 714 183 697 
 
EBITDA 1,591 1,521 1,753 1,468 1,789 2,168 2,055 2,133 3,101 
 
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.021 0.016 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.045 0.040 0.009 0.033 0.0274 
Gearing 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 4% 4% 1% 3% 0.0264 
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Working Capital Analysis 
(Indicator “d” is number of days) 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average 
07/15 
Receivable from customers 
and others 
256 306 116 206 479 366 72 -25 -35 
 
Inventories 62 168 217 100 77 59 42 56 36 
 
Payable to suppliers and 
others 
994 912 875 808 996 1,072 873 900 862 
 
Working Capital -676 -438 -542 -502 -440 -647 -759 -869 -861 
 
% of Turnover -22% -12% -13% -14% -12% -16% -20% -24% -19% -17% 
Receivable days (% Sales) 30.2 d 30.5 d 10.1 d 20.6 d 34.1 d 32.2 d 5.4 d -1.2 d -4.4 d 17.5 
Days of stock (% Sales) 18.7 d 34.0 d 37.2 d 19.6 d  18.7 d 13.5 d 11.0 d 19.8 d 12.8 d 20.6 
Payable days (% Sales) 21.3 d 22.8d 13.2 d 9.1 d 23.2 d 18.9 d 13.1 d 12.1 d 5.5 d 15.5 
Payable days (% Opex and 
CAPEX) 
241.9 242.9 204.5 224.9 103.2 178.3 286.6 185.9 184.1 205.8 
 
Cash flows 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EBIT+DA 1,591 1,521 1,753 1,468 1,789 2,168 2,055 2,133 3,101 
Working capital -676 -438 -542 -502 -440 -647 -759 -869 -861 
Receivables 256 306 116 206 335 366 72 -25 -35 
Stocks & prepayment net of 
supplier payables 
-118 -61 65 9 -7 -156 -94 -63 -32 
Payables to others -814 -683 -723 -717 -768 -857 -737 -781 -794 
Change in working capital 
 
238 -104 40 62 -207 -112 -110 8 
Receivables 
 
50 -190 90 129 31 -294 -97 -10 
Stocks net of supplier payables 
 
57 126 -56 -16 -149 62 31 31 
Payables to others 
 
131 -40 6 -51 -89 120 -44 -13 
Tax Paid 
 
188 906 732 329 21 25 17 169 
Cash flow from operations 
 
1,095 951 696 1,398 2,354 2,142 2,226 2,924 
Investment 
 
-294 -419 -482 2,400 606 -369 696 434 
Cash flow before financing 
 
1,389 1,370 1,178 -1,002 1,748 2,511 1,530 2,490 
Debt financing (increase in) 
 
19 0 0 35 582 -2 -531 514 
Cash flow before equity 
movements  
1,408 1,370 1,178 -967 2,330 2,509 999 3,004 
Share capital increase 
 
0 0 0 0 -136 -185 179 -226 
Dividend paid 
 
-910.6 -2,176 -1,820 -554.4 153.41 196.23 9.2409 1,748 
Cash flow after financing 
 
2,319 3,546 2,998 -412.6 2,041 2,128 1,169 1029.84 
B/S change in Cash 
 
182 68 -348 306 -286 -1 490 286 
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Others ratios 
    
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EBIT ->Cash flow 
(before financing) 
conversion ratio 
0.93 0.81 0.83 -0.58 0.82 1.25 0.73 0.80 




       




       
Growth in retained 
earnings 
  
42% 25% 17% 30% 33% 23% 20% 24% 
(Cum. Cash flow) / 
(Cum. Sales) ratio 
  
38% 35% 34% 19% 24% 31% 33% 36% 
Interest Coverage Ratio 497% 2432% 11433% 3120% 206% 576% 127% 4122% 
Cash flow to Debt 127% 98% 95% -58% 103% 82% 45% 108% 
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Activision Blizzard 
Figures in Millions of United States Dollars 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Revenues 4,755 4,856 4,583 4,408 4,664 
CoGS, HW & Third parties 1,134 1,116 3,201 2,786 2,447 
G&A 456 561 490 417 380 
Taxes and similar 3 7 53 146 229 
D&A 218 194 187 260 412 
Cost, of which 1,811 1,878 3,931 3,609 3,468 
EBIT after extraordinary items 2,944 2,978 652 799 1,196 
Interest costs, net 0 0 53 202 198 
EBT 2,944 2,978 599 597 998 
Tax declared 246 246 309 146 229 
PAT 2,698 2,732 290 451 769 
Dividend declared 194 204 216 147 170 
Net income 2,504 2,528 74 304 599 




 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gross margin 76% 77% 30% 37% 48% 
Other Variable costs 0 0 1,767 1,734 1,788 
Net Gross Margin 76% 77% -8.4% -3% 9% 
EBITDA Margin 66% 65% 18% 24% 34% 
EBIT Margin 62% 61% 14% 18% 26% 
PAT% of sales 57% 56% 6% 10% 16% 
 
Cost Structure Analysis 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
G&A % of sales 10% 12% 11% 9% 8% 
Salaries % of sales 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
D&A % of sales 5% 4% 4% 6% 9% 
Extraordinary item % of sales 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
EBIT % of sales - before Ex. Items 62% 61% 14% 18% 26% 
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Capital Efficiency ratios 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Net Profit 2,698 2,732 290 451 769 
Equity 12,120 14,482 14,788 15,334 16,251 
ROE 22% 19% 2% 3% 5% 
ROA 15% 13% 0% 1% 3% 
Tax rate      
NOPAT 2,944 2,978 652 799 1,196 
Interest Bearing Liabilities (net) 2,785 2,883 7,390 2,714 2,611 
Invested Capital 14,905 17,365 22,178 18,048 18,862 
ROIC 20% 17% 3% 4% 6% 
 
Liquidity ratios 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cash ratio 0.55 0.67 0.43 0.76 0.30 
Liquid ratio 1.20 1.45 0.64 2.49 1.72 
Current ratio 1.25 1.51 0.66 2.56 1.79 
Quick Ratio 1.49 1.76 2.05 3.34 2.32 
 
Stability ratios 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.23 0.20 0.50 0.18 0.16 0.25 
Gearing 19% 17% 33% 15% 14% 0.19 
Debt cover Ratio 0.9 0.9 8.8 2.6 1.6  
 
Working Capital Analysis 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Working Capital 403 573 331 3,559 3,577 
% of Turnover 8% 12% 7% 81% 77% 
Receivable days (% Sales) 50 d 53 d 41 d 55 d 53 d 
Days of stock (% Sales) 46 d 68 d 19 d 17 d 18 d 
Payable days (% Sales) 30 d 26 d 28 d 27 d 22 d 
Payable days (% Opex and CAPEX) 9 45 35 80 82 
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Cash flows 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Working capital 403 573 331 3,559 3,577 
Receivables 649 707 515 4,220 4,240 
Change in working capital 403 170 (242) 3,228 18 
Interest Paid 0 0 53 202 198 
Tax Paid 246 246 309 136 229 
Cashflow from operations 2,513 2,756 719 -2,507 1,163 
Investment 13,495 1,117 (1) 890 1,021 
Cashflow before financing -10,982 1,639 720 -3,397 142 
Debt financing (increase in) 2,785 98 4,507 (4,676) (103) 
Cashflow before equity movements (8,197) 1,737 5,227 (8,073) 39 
Share capital increase 9,616 (166) 232 242 318 
Dividend paid 1,148 1,112 1,024 147 170 
Cashflow after financing 271 459 4,435 -7,978 187 









(3.73) 0.55 1.10 (4.25) 0.12 
Cumulated Retained 
earnings incl. Dividends 
2,698 5,430 5,720 6,171 6,940 
(Cum. Cashflow) / (Cum. 
Sales) ratio 
-231% -97% -61% -65% -51% 
Interest Coverage Ratio 0 0 2738% 586% 666% 
Cashflow to Debt 5% 8% 45% -147% 4% 
Operating Cash Flow 6% 9% 97% -181% 4% 
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Appendix VII: Analysis of Stock Returns 
 Methodology  
GARCH Modeling  
We begin with Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models developed by 
Robert Engle (1982) that are non-linear. In practice ARCH models are a good tool for measuring 
volatility of returns. 
To model the volatility, we first tried to fit ARIMA, which is a basic model used for 
analyzing time series data. However, as the data often appear to be non-stationary, and 
heteroscedasticity was also found to be present; models from the Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedastic (ARCH) can also be applied. The most tangible result of ARCH analysis is the 
apparent changes in volatility; as they may be predicted and resulted from specific type of nonlinear 
dependencies rather than exogenous structural changes in variables. Despite its all proven efficiency, 
ARCH models are not without drawbacks. ARCH models  typically has long lags in the conditional 
variance equation, leading to a problem with negative variance parameter estimates, and thus 
requiring remedy for fixed lag structure. The lag may be too large and thusly “non-negative 
condition” may not always hold. 
Bolerslev (1986) addresses this inefficient by the introduction of Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models, which remedy this problem. Concurrently, the 
GARCH process is employed by financial experts because it provides more realist context in 
comparison to other models when predicting the prices and rates of financial instruments. Further 
extensions such as NGARCH, IGARCH, GARCH-M, QGARCH, EGARCH, TGARCH known as 
GJR-GARCH and others from the FGARCH group include leverage terms for modeling 
asymmetric volatility clustering. 
 Unlike conventional econometric models for analyzing time series data, which operate 
under the assumption of constant variance, the ARCH process allows the conditional variance to 
change over time as a function of past errors, thus leaving the unconditional variance constant. The 
general form of ARCH models is as follows: 
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    Where                                             𝑢𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡√ℎ𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0,1)  
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑤 + ∑𝑖=1
𝑞 𝑎𝑖𝑢𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑𝑖=1
𝑝 𝛽𝑖ℎ𝑡−𝑖    (2) 
Where equation (1) is a mean equation for returns on 𝑦𝑡 which potentially follow AR or MA 
processes. The error term "𝑢𝑡" is a function of stochastic term "𝑧𝑡"  (white noise) and time-varying 
variance"ℎ𝑡". Equation (2) characterizes conditional variance (volatility) which gives weight to 
unconditional variance (w), pervious forecast (ℎ𝑡−𝑖 ), and the news or innovations measured as the 
squares of previous period’s return(𝑢𝑡−𝑖
2 ).  
Depending on the predictions, other exogenous variables and dummies can be introduced to 
the mean and variance equations for measurement of asymmetric effects. These effects can affect 
future returns and volatility. 
The first model to be tested shall be GARCH, defined and implemented by Bollerslev 
(1986). GARCH (1, 1) illustrates volatility process as follows: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑤 + 𝛼𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1       (3) 
The most important characteristics of this process is its mean reversion (imposed by the 
restriction "𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1") and its symmetry (equal weights given to both negative and positive 
returns, which may be interpreted as bad and good news). In addition the Author will employ 
models that control for asymmetric news effect. GJR-ARCH developed by Glosten et al. in 1993 
represents volatility process as: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑤 + 𝛼𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝐼𝑡−1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1   (4) 
For 𝑢𝑡 < 0,   𝐼𝑡 = 1 and zero otherwise. Thusly, bad news has given greater weight in 
comparison to good news. 
Another model which will be used is Threshold GARCH (TGARCH), developed by Zakoian 
in 1994, this model is quite similar to GJR-GARCH. The specification is on conditional standard 
deviation instead of conditional variance (𝜎𝑡).  
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𝜎𝑡 = 𝑤 + 𝛼1𝑢𝑡−1
+ + 𝛼2𝑢𝑡−1
− + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1   (5) 
Where 𝑢𝑡−1
+ = 𝑢𝑡−1, for positive returns and zero otherwise. In contrast for negative or zero 
returns𝑢𝑡−1
− = 𝑢𝑡−1, and zero otherwise.   
VAR Model 
Vector Auto regression (VAR) is natural generalization of autoregressive models in multivariate 
setting. It includes a system of equation with dependent variables regressed lags of each other. VAR 
models provide qualitative analysis of relationship between variables which is suitable for forecasting 
the mean and analysis of impulse, response function and variance decomposition.  
 VAR models are used to capture the linear interdependencies among multiple time series. 
VAR models generalize the univariate autoregressive model (AR model) by allowing for more than 
one evolving variable. All variables in a VAR are treated symmetrically in a structural sense; each 
variable has an equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the lags of the other 
model variables.  
 The general form of VAR (p) is:  




 VAR models are data driven models. In this section we show a bivariate VAR of first order 
that is going to be used in our analysis.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎10 + 𝑎11𝑦1,𝑡−1 + 𝑎12𝑧1,𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝑎20 + 𝑎21𝑦1,𝑡−1 + 𝑎22𝑧1,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑡 
 
 As we can see from the equations above, VAR models require models with endogenous 
variables in their construct as the first variable (y) has an impact on the second variable (z).  




Our data set consists of 6560 observations of historical prices of EA. The first observation in the 
data is dated 1990. We can see the effects two distinct crises, the 2000 IT bubble and 2007 subprime 
crisis.  
 
Figure 21: Historical stock prices of EA 
The effect of both of these crises is transparent on the data. Based on our observation we 
suspect that this dataset is not stationary. After confirming our suspicion with Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test and furthermore with KPSS test.  
Judging by the visual inspection of the data this dataset is non-stationary.  




Autocorrelation function for EA 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels 
Using standard error 1/T^0.5 
 
LAG      ACF          PACF         Q-stat. [p-value] 
 
1   0.9959 ***   0.9959 ***   5609.0607 [0.000] 
2   0.9918 *** -0.0046      11173.1197 [0.000] 
3   0.9881 ***   0.0424 *** 16696.3870 [0.000] 
4   0.9844 *** -0.0031      22178.9193 [0.000] 
5   0.9809 ***   0.0380 *** 27624.2749 [0.000] 
6   0.9778 ***   0.0333 **   33035.7409 [0.000] 
7   0.9745 *** -0.0177      38411.6818 [0.000] 
8   0.9711 *** -0.0048      43751.6445 [0.000] 
9   0.9679 ***   0.0062      49056.4538 [0.000] 
10   0.9647 ***   0.0206      54327.9858 [0.000] 
11   0.9621 ***   0.0575 *** 59571.5019 [0.000] 
12   0.9592 *** -0.0257 *    64784.9351 [0.000] 
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13   0.9562 *** -0.0163      69966.5462 [0.000] 
14   0.9530 *** -0.0235 *    75114.4984 [0.000] 
15   0.9495 *** -0.0348 *** 80225.6559 [0.000] 
16   0.9461 ***   0.0127      85301.4100 [0.000] 
17   0.9430 ***   0.0175      90344.2498 [0.000] 
18   0.9399 ***   0.0113      95355.4705 [0.000] 
19   0.9374 ***   0.0563 *** 100340.0998 [0.000] 
20   0.9345 *** -0.0307 ** 105295.5233 [0.000] 
21   0.9313 *** -0.0425 *** 110217.3899 [0.000] 
22   0.9281 ***   0.0042     115106.6588 [0.000] 
23   0.9251 ***   0.0169     119965.2359 [0.000] 
24   0.9220 *** -0.0176     124791.8844 [0.000] 
25   0.9191 ***   0.0176     129588.8977 [0.000] 
26   0.9162 ***   0.0038     134356.6954 [0.000] 
27   0.9133 ***   0.0161     139095.9040 [0.000] 
28   0.9103 *** -0.0207     143804.7255 [0.000] 
29   0.9074 ***   0.0181     148484.5288 [0.000] 
30   0.9047 ***   0.0128     153137.3826 [0.000] 
31   0.9020 *** -0.0160     157762.5627 [0.000] 
32   0.8997 ***   0.0594 *** 162364.8770 [0.000] 
33   0.8977 ***   0.0479 *** 166948.3827 [0.000] 
34   0.8955 *** -0.0276 ** 171510.0079 [0.000] 
35   0.8931 *** -0.0134     176047.8321 [0.000] 
36   0.8907 *** -0.0014     180562.1469 [0.000] 
37   0.8882 *** -0.0143     185051.4934 [0.000] 
 
 
To confirm this result we provide the result of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for EA 
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Including 32 lags of (1-L) EA 
(Max was 32, criterion AIC) 
Sample size 5619 
Unit-root null hypothesis: a = 1 
 
  Test with constant  
  Model: (1-L) y = b0 + (a-1)*y (-1) + ... + e 
  Estimated value of (a - 1): -0.00292405 
  Test statistic: tau_c (1) = -2.43319 
  Asymptotic p-value 0.1326 
  1st-order autocorrelation coeff. For e: 0.001 
  Lagged differences: F (32, 5585) = 4.741 [0.0000] 
 
  With constant and trend  
  Model: (1-L) y = b0 + b1*t + (a-1)*y (-1) + ... + e 
  Estimated value of (a - 1): -0.00293035 
  Test statistic: tau_ct (1) = -2.42054 
  Asymptotic p-value 0.3687 
  1st-order autocorrelation coeff. For e: 0.001 
  Lagged differences: F (32, 5584) = 4.739 [0.0000] 
 
As is evident by the results we do not reject the Null hypothesis of unit root and proceed to further 
confirm the results with KPSS test.  
KPSS test for EA (including seasonals) 
 
T = 5652 
Lag truncation parameter = 10 
Test statistic = 6.85899 
 
                   10%      5%      1% 
Critical values: 0.347   0.462   0.744 
P-value < .01 
 
Testing the null hypothesis of stationary, we strongly reject the null hypothesis and proceed to take 
the log difference of the data set. 
 In order to solve the problem, the Author took the log-first difference and the results are now 
stationary. After taking the log, first different of our data set we can see a clear stationary data with 
extreme volatility during the crisis years.  
Appendix VII: Analysis of Stock Returns 82 
 
 
Figure 22: Log, first difference of dataset. 
The log-differenced time series is shown in the plot in Figure 2 above. While the mean now 
seems constant, the residuals seem Heteroscedastic, and not normally distributed. 
 
Figure 23: ACF and PACF correlogram for log-differenced dataset. 
We can observe significance of the second lag and some significance of the third. In addition 
the visual inspection yields significance of the 32nd lag. However we will ignore this dependency to 
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avoid the unnecessary sophistication of our model. We confirm our visual inspection by information 
criterion. 
The next step is ARIMA modeling of our data. The optimal number of lags required is not 
clearly determined. The Akaike and Hannan-Quinn criterions suggested three lags and Schwarz 
criterion suggested two lags. Despite the suggestion of AR (2) and MA (3) process in the data, 
ARIMA (2, 0, 2) was the only model that provided the minimum information criterion. Moreover all 
autoregressive terms and moving average terms are significant, the Q statistics of Ljung-Box test 
confirms our results. Thus the Author has used ARIMA (2, 0, and 2) for further analysis below. 
Model 3: ARMA, using observations 1993-11-26:2015-07-24 (T = 5651) 
Dependent variable: ld_EA 
Standard errors based on Hessian 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
Const 9.8928e-05 0.000438768 0.2255 0.8216  
Phi_1 0.928998 0.0465502 19.9569 <0.0001 *** 
Phi_2 −0.894876 0.0984674 −9.0880 <0.0001 *** 
Theta_1 −0.948342 0.0444932 −21.3143 <0.0001 *** 
Theta_2 0.894574 0.0952984 9.3871 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.000100  S.D. dependent var  0.033714 
Mean of innovations  7.44e-07  S.D. of innovations  0.033668 
Log-likelihood  11145.19  Akaike criterion −22278.39 
Schwarz criterion −22238.55  Hannan-Quinn −22264.51 
 
  Real Imaginary Modulus Frequency 
AR       
 Root 1  0.5191 -0.9209 1.0571 -0.1683 
 Root 2  0.5191 0.9209 1.0571 0.1683 
MA       
 Root 1  0.5301 -0.9148 1.0573 -0.1664 
 Root 2  0.5301 0.9148 1.0573 0.1664 
 
 
Ljung-Box Q' = 25.7406, 
With p-value = P (Chi-square (1) > 25.7406) = 3.905e-007  
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The Author suspected the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity. Our suspicion was 
confirmed by ARCH-LM test. It fails to reject null hypothesis of no dependencies (p-value close to 
0.9). Results of the test are presented here. Concluding that there are further decencies in our 
residuals. We save the residuals and proceed to GARCH modeling.  
ARCH-LM test results 
 
                   Coefficient        std. error    t-ratio      p-value 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             Alpha (0)   0.00109664    0.000134992   8.124     5.51e-016 *** 
Alpha (1)   0.0122191     0.0133152     0.9177    0.3588 
Alpha (2)   0.00363046    0.0133159     0.2726    0.7851 
Alpha (3)   0.00340330    0.0133160     0.2556    0.7983 
Alpha (4)   0.00653649    0.0133160     0.4909    0.6235 
Alpha (5)   0.00729274    0.0133153     0.5477    0.5839 
 
Null hypothesis: no ARCH effect is present 
Test statistic: LM = 1.55698 
With p-value = P (Chi-square (5) > 1.55698) = 0.906402 
 
GARCH Family Fitting 
  
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
alpha(0) 0.000149491 1.53096e-05 9.7645 <0.0001 *** 
alpha(1) 0.360439 0.0268694 13.4145 <0.0001 *** 
beta(1) 0.603532 0.0245769 24.5569 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.000100  S.D. dependent var  0.033714 
Log-likelihood  11580.64  Akaike criterion −23153.29 
Schwarz criterion −23126.73  Hannan-Quinn −23144.04 
Figure 24: GARCH Analysis 
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TARCH model 
coefficient std. error Z P-value 
omega 
 
0.000159913 0.000108593 1.473 0.1409 
alpha 0.279484 0.122927 2.274 0.0230 











Log likelihood:  11712.21405 AIC: -23414.42810 
BIC:  -23381.23016 HQC: -23402.86455 
TARCH (1, 1) 
 
  




Model: GJR (1, 1) [Glosten et al.] (Normal)* 
Dependent variable: ld_EA 
Sample: 1994-09-07-2016-07-24 (T = 5651), VCV method: Robust 
 
Conditional mean equation 
 
Coefficient   std. error      z     p-value 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Const      0.000508366   0.000402921   1.262   0.2071 
 
Conditional variance equation 
 
Coefficient   std. error      z     p-value 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Omega      0.000125576   8.31185e-05   1.511   0.1308 
Alpha      0.286780      0.174180      1.646   0.0997   * 
Gamma      0.430979      0.0712428     6.049   1.45e-09 *** 





Coefficient   std. error      z     p-value 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Delta      0.000125576   8.31185e-05   1.511   0.1308 
Alpha      0.0928551     0.0477410     1.945   0.0518 * 
Gamma      0.494384      0.351892      1.405   0.1600 
Beta       0.643624      0.172846      3.724   0.0002 *** 
 
Llik:  11701.03094  AIC: -23392.06187 
BIC:  -23358.86393  HQC: -23380.49832 
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VAR Model Analysis 
Vector Auto regression (VAR) is a data driven model and the historical value of each variable plays a 
role in its future determinant. After performing a sensitivity analysis on full sample and a restrictive 
sample, the Author decided to use restricted sample range; excluding the crisis years of IT bubble in 
2000s, Subprime crisis of 2007, and economic recession of 2009.  The new dataset begin on 
07.01.2011 and the last observation is dated 4.5.2016. The Author decided not to take the first 
difference of dataset to avoid the loss of long term trend between the two variables. The result of 
the inverse roots shown distinct signs of stationary.  
  
Figure 25: Inverse roots of VAR model 
Figure 26 contains the inverse roots of VAR model before log differencing (left) and after 
log differencing (right). Our restricted sample range lacks the rich volume as it contains 1389 
observations.  
 
Figure 26: Forecasted stock prices using VAR 
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The blue line represents the fitted values and the red line is the actual value. We can observe 
clear trend within 5% level confidence interval. The result of our prediction confirms the figure 
above.  
Another widely used feature of VAR models is the impulse response functions which are 
used by the Author to determine the volatility of the company in response to shocks.  
 
Figure 27: Impulse response function (numbers are in percentage points). 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we determined that the model that fits our data best is GARCH (1, 1). All three 
information criteria were the lowest and the estimates were significant. When conducting our 
analysis of the asymmetry effect, our estimate (gamma) was positive and significant.   
We used the VAR model to forecast the mean of our data. We assessed the response of the 
company stock performance is high. It occurs within the first day and smooth out by the end of 
sixth day, assuming the shock to the NASDAQ 100 is not persistent. We determine the volatility of 
stock returns for Electronic Arts. After fitting the ARIMA modeling, we start ARCH analysis and 
several models of GARCH family. We find the leverage effect is present in the data. Then we assess 
the mean forecast using VAR model and response of the company to an external shock. The shock 
to NASDAQ index can significantly hurt market capitalization. Assuming a non-persistent shock 
market, the response of company stock imitates a small persistent shock.    
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Appendix VIII: EA Balance Sheet Forecast 
Figures in millions of United States Dollars 
 
2008 2009 2008 2009 
 
Forecast Actual 
Assets         
Current assets         
Cash and cash equivalents  $      1,439   $      1,511   $   1,553   $   1,621  
Short-term investments  $      1,327   $      1,393   $      734   $      534  
Marketable equity securities.  $         358   $         376   $      729   $      365  
Receivables,  $         269   $         282   $      306   $      116  
Inventories  $           65   $           68   $      168   $      217  
Deferred income taxes  $           88   $           93   $      145   $        51  
Other current assets  $         230   $         241   $      290   $      216  
Total current assets  $      3,776   $      3,964   $   3,925   $   3,120  
 
        
Property  $         508   $         533   $      396   $      354  
Acquisition-related intangibles  $            -     $            -     $         -     $      221  
Investments in affiliates  $             6   $             7   $         -     $         -    
Goodwill  $         771   $         809   $   1,152   $      807  
Other intangibles  $         220   $         231   $      265   $         -    
Deferred income taxes  $           26   $           28   $      164   $        61  
Other assets  $           94   $           99   $      157   $      115  
TOTAL ASSETS  $      5,402   $      5,672   $   6,059   $   4,678  
 
        
Current liabilities         
Accounts payable  $    188.97   $    198.39   $      229   $      152  
Accrued and other current liabilities  $    864.01   $    907.07   $      683   $      723  
Deferred net revenue  $      24.15   $      25.35   $      387   $      261  
Total current liabilities  $      1,077   $      1,131   $   1,299   $   1,136  
minority interest  $            -     $            -       $         -    
Income tax obligations  $            -     $            -     $      319   $      268  
Deferred income taxes  $             8   $             9   $          5   $        42  
Other liabilities  $           84   $           88   $        97   $        98  
Total liabilities  $      1,169   $      1,228   $   1,720   $   1,544  
Common stock  $             3   $             3   $          3   $          3  
Paid-in capital  $      1,482   $      1,556   $   1,864   $   2,142  
Retained earnings  $      2,439   $      2,560   $   1,888   $      800  
Accumulated other income   $         309   $         324   $      584   $      189  
Total stockholders’ equity  $      4,233   $      4,444   $   4,339   $   3,134  
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TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY  $      5,402   $      5,672   $   6,059   $   4,678  
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Appendix IIX: EA Income Statement Forecast 
Figures in millions of United States Dollars 
 2008 2009 2008 2009 
 
Forecast Actual 
Net revenue  $      3,245   $      3,407   $   3,665   $   4,212  
Cost of goods sold  $      1,272   $      1,336   $   1,805   $   2,127  
Gross profit  $      1,973   $      2,071   $   1,860   $   2,085  
 
        
Operating expenses:         
Marketing and sales  $         489   $         514   $      588   $      691  
General and administrative  $         302   $         317   $      339   $      332  
Research and development  $      1,093   $      1,147   $   1,145   $   1,359  
Amortization of intangibles  $           28   $           30   $        34   $        80  
Acquired in-process technology  $             3   $             3   $        34   $        58  
Restructuring charges  $           16   $           17   $      103   $         -    
Total operating expenses  $      1,932   $      2,028   $   2,243   $   2,520  
 
        
Operating income  $           41   $           43   $     (487)  $     (827) 
Interest and other income  $         104   $         109   $        98   $        34  
Losses on strategic investments      $     (118)  $       (62) 
Income before provision for income taxes  $         145   $         152   $     (507)  $     (855) 
Provision for income taxes  $           69   $           73   $       (53)  $      233  
Income before minority interest  $           76   $           79   $         -     $         -    
Minority interest  $             4   $             4   $         -     $         -    
Net income  $           80   $           84   $     (454)  $  (1,088) 
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Appendix IX: Space Matrix 
Internal Analysis: External Analysis: 
Financial Position (FP)   Stability Position (SP)   
Return on Investment (ROI) 5 Rate of Inflation -2 
Leverage 4 Technological Changes -4 
Liquidity  7 Price Elasticity of Demand -4 
Working Capital  5 Competitive Pressure -4 
Cash Flow 6 Barriers to Entry into Market -7 
  
Financial Position (FP) Average 5.4 Stability Position (SP) Average      -4.2 
  
  
Internal Analysis: External Analysis: 
Competitive Position (CP) Industry Position (IP) 
 
Market Share -3 Growth Potential 2 
Product Quality -1 Financial Stability 7 
Customer Loyalty -5 Ease of Entry into Market 7 
Technological know-how -1 Resource Utilization 6 
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Appendix X: List of EA’s acquisitions 
Date Acquired Amount 
Sep 27, 2012 ESN Social Software  Unknown  
Dec 1, 2011 KlickNation  Unknown  
Jul 12, 2011 Popcap Games  $1.3B in Cash & Stock  
May 3, 2011 Firemint  Unknown  
Oct, 2010 Chillingo  $20M in Cash  
Nov 9, 2009 Playfish $400M in Cash & Stock  
Jun 19, 2009 J2Play Unknown  
Dec 2, 2008 J2MSoft  Unknown  
Jun 3, 2008 ThreeSF  $15M (terms undisclosed)  
May 23, 2008 Hands-On Mobile  Unknown  
May 8, 2008 Rupture  $15M in Cash  
Oct 11, 2007 VG Holding  $860M (terms undisclosed)  
Oct 5, 2007 Super Computer International  Unknown  
Feb 12, 2007 SingShot Media  Unknown  
Nov 30, 2006 Headgate Studios Unknown  
Oct 2, 2006 Digital Illusions  Unknown  




Jun 20, 2006 Mythic Entertainment  Unknown  
Dec 8, 2005 JAMDAT Mobile  $680M in Cash  
Jul 27, 2005 Hypnotix  Unknown  
Jul 28, 2004 Criterion Software Group  Unknown  
Feb 13, 2004 NuFX Unknown  
Oct 16, 2003 Studio 33 Unknown  
Jun 11, 2002 Black Box Games  Unknown  
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Feb 28, 2001 Pogo.com  Unknown  
Feb 24, 2000 DreamWorks Interactive  Unknown  
Nov 22, 1999 Kesmai  Unknown  
Sep 8, 1999 PlayNation  Unknown  
Sep 8, 1998 Westwood Studios  $122.5M (terms undisclosed)  
Jul 28, 1998 ABC Software  Unknown  
Apr 2, 1998 Tiburon Entertainment  Unknown  
Jul 28, 1997 Maxis  $125M in Stock  
Apr 8, 1996 Vision Software PTY  Unknown  
Jan 29, 1996 Manley & Associates  Unknown  
Jan 6, 1995 Bullfrog Productions  Unknown  
Nov 14, 1994 DROsoft  Unknown  
Sep, 1992 Origin Systems  $35M in Stock  
Aug 1, 1991 Distinctive Software  Unknown  
 
 Source: (Crunchbase database, 2016) 
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Appendix XI: List of Activision’s acquisitions 
Date Acquired Amount 
Jan 4, 2016 Major League Gaming $46M in Cash 
Nov 2, 2015 King.com $5.9B (terms undisclosed)  
Apr 6, 2009 California 7 Studios Unknown  
Nov 10, 2008 Budcat Creations Unknown  
Mar 6, 2007 DemonWare Unknown 
May 9, 2006 RedOctane Unknown  
Jan 5, 2006 High Moon Studios  Unknown  
May 25, 2005 Beenox Unknown  
May 22, 2002 Z-Axis Ltd. Unknown  
Apr 2, 2002 Shaba Games $7.4M in Stock 




Oct 3, 2001 Treyarch $20M in Stock 
 
(CrunchBase data base, 2016) 
                  
